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The Innocent Eye
'The Innocent Eye' develops a way of understanding vision inspired by recent literature in situated cognition. To explain why the world looks as it does, the book appeals to the structure of the environment in which we are situated and to our attunement to that environment. This approach contrasts with models of vision in cognitive science that treat visual processing as an ìnference' or a c̀onstruction,' where representational resources are used to produce visual percepts. The main claim of the book is that this construction is both unnecessary and unsupported by the evidence.
The Innocent Eye
Why does the world look to us as it does? Generally speaking, this question has received two types of answers in the cognitive sciences in the past fifty or so years. According to the first, the world looks to us the way it does because we construct it to look as it does. According to the second, the world looks as it does primarily because of how the world is. In The Innocent Eye, Nico Orlandi defends a position that aligns with this second, world-centered tradition, but that also respects some of the insights of constructivism. Orlandi develops an embedded understanding of visual processing according to which, while visual percepts are representational states, the states and structures tha...
What are Mental Representations?
The topic of this book is mental representation, a theoretical concept that lies at the core of cognitive science. Together with the idea that thinking is analogous to computational processing, this concept is responsible for the "cognitive turn" in the sciences of the mind and brain since the 1950s. Conceiving of cognitive processes (such as perception, reasoning, and motor control) as consisting of the manipulation of contentful vehicles that represent the world has led to tremendous empirical advancements in our explanations of behaviour. Perhaps the most famous discovery that explains behavior by appealing to the notion of mental representations was the discovery of 'place' cells that un...
The Border Between Seeing and Thinking
"What is the difference between seeing and thinking? Is the border between seeing and thinking a joint in nature in the sense of a fundamental explanatory difference? Is it a difference of degree? Does thinking affect seeing, i.e. is seeing "cognitively penetrable"? Are we aware of faces, causation, numerosity and other "high-level" properties or only of the colors, shapes and textures that-according to the advocate of high level perception--are the basis on which we see them? Is perception conceptual and propositional? Is perception iconic or more akin to language in being discursive? Is seeing singular? Which is more fundamental, visual attribution or visual discrimination? Is all seeing s...
Enactivist Interventions
Enactivist Interventions is an interdisciplinary work that explores how theories of embodied cognition illuminate many aspects of the mind, including intentionality, representation, the affect, perception, action and free will, higher-order cognition, and intersubjectivity. Gallagher arguesfor a rethinking of the concept of mind, drawing on pragmatism, phenomenology and cognitive science. Enactivism is presented as a philosophy of nature that has significant methodological and theoretical implications for the scientific investigation of the mind. Gallagher argues that, like the basicphenomena of perception and action, sophisticated cognitive phenomena like reflection, imagining, and mathemat...
Experienced Wholeness
An interdisciplinary account of phenomenal unity, investigating how experiential wholes can be characterized and how such characterizations can be analyzed computationally. How can we account for phenomenal unity? That is, how can we characterize and explain our experience of objects and groups of objects, bodily experiences, successions of events, and the attentional structure of consciousness as wholes? In this book, Wanja Wiese develops an interdisciplinary account of phenomenal unity, investigating how experiential wholes can be characterized and how such characterization can be analyzed conceptually as well as computationally. Wiese first addresses how the unity of consciousness can be ...
The Attending Mind
This book discusses how attention relates to the self, perception, knowledge, consciousness, action, and responsibility.
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Implicit Cognition
Humans think of ourselves as acting according to reasons that we can typically articulate and acknowledge, though we may be reluctant to do so. Yet some of our actions do not fit this mold—they seem to arise from motives and thoughts that appear outside of our control and our self-awareness. Rather than treating such cases as outliers, theorists now treat significant parts of the mind as operating implicitly or ‘behind the scenes’. Mental faculties like reasoning, language, and memory seem to involve this sort of implicit cognition, and many of the structures we use to understand one another seem infused with biases, perceptions, and stereotypes that have implicit features. The Routled...
Beyond Vision
Beyond Vision brings together eight essays by Casey O'Callaghan. The works draw theoretical and philosophical lessons about perception, the nature of its objects, and sensory awareness through sustained attention to extra-visual and multisensory forms of perception and perceptual consciousness. O'Callaghan focuses on auditory perception, perception of spoken language, and multisensory perception. The first essays concern the nature of audition's objects, focusing on sounds, especially drawing attention to the ways in which they contrast with vision's objects. The middle essays explore forms of auditory perception that could not be explained without understanding audition's interactions with ...
The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Social Science
37 Why Is There No Philosophy of Political Science?
