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Picture Perception in Animals
Animal researchers commonly present pictures to their subjects, usually birds or monkeys, in order to infer how natural objects are perceived and conceptualised, or to discover the brain mechanisms underlying these abilities. This unique book questions the premise of this experimental approach and asks whether or not pictures can be considered as ecologically valid and realistic stimuli for animals. Leading researchers in comparative psychology and neuroscience address such questions as: "Can animals recognise objects of scenes in pictures despite variations in viewpoints?; "How do animals perceive faces?" and "Is there an equivalence, in animals' minds, between pictures and the objects they represent?". The result is an authoritative and cutting-edge survey of current knowledge in the field, which underlines the advantages, limits and risks of using pictures to infer cognitive abilities or brain mechanisms in animal studies. Picture Perception in Animals will be essential reading for comparative psychologists, anthropologists, and neuroscientists working in picture perception.
Looking Into Pictures
In this text, philosophers, psychologists and art historians explore the implications of theories of vision for our understanding of the nature of pictorial representation and picture perception.
The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception
This is a book about how we see: the environment around us (its surfaces, their layout, and their colors and textures); where we are in the environment; whether or not we are moving and, if we are, where we are going; what things are good for; how to do things (to thread a needle or drive an automobile); or why things look as they do. The basic assumption is that vision depends on the eye which is connected to the brain. The author suggests that natural vision depends on the eyes in the head on a body supported by the ground, the brain being only the central organ of a complete visual system. When no constraints are put on the visual system, people look around, walk up to something interesting and move around it so as to see it from all sides, and go from one vista to another. That is natural vision -- and what this book is about.
The Relational View of Perception
Relationalism is the view in philosophy of mind that particulars in our environment are constituents of conscious perception. It is an important theory of perceptual experience, offering explanations of perception's phenomenal character and its epistemic and semantic role. However, it has also been criticised for a lack of empirical grounding. In this outstanding collection, an international team of contributors examine relationalism and consider its role in philosophy of mind and perception across four key areas: The significance of empirical evidence to the theory of relationalism Dependence of experience on the subject’s internal makeup Hallucinations and the unity of perceptual experience Relationalism and empirical knowledge. The Relational View of Perception: New Philosophical Essays will be of great interest to advanced students and scholars in philosophy of mind. Contributors: Dominic Alford-Duguid, Rami Ali, Ori Beck, Alex Byrne, Elijah Chudnoff, Peter Epstein, Craig French, E. J. Green, Roberta Locatelli, Heather Logue, Farid Masrour, Alva Noë, Adam Pautz, Ian Phillips, Thomas Raleigh, Susanna Schellenberg, Umrao Sethi, Matthew Soteriou, and Lisa Titus.
Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception
Bence Nanay explores how many influential debates in aesthetics look very different, and may be easier to tackle, if we clarify the assumptions they make about perception and experience. He focuses on the ways in which the distinction between distributed and focused attention can help us re-evaluate various key concepts and debates in aesthetics.
The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception
According to the cognitive penetrability hypothesis, our beliefs, desires, and possibly our emotions literally affect how we see the world. This book elucidates the nature of the cognitive penetrability and impenetrability hypotheses, assesses their plausibility, and explores their philosophical consequences. It connects the topic's multiple strands (the psychological findings, computationalist background, epistemological consequences of cognitive architecture, and recent philosophical developments) at a time when the outcome of many philosophical debates depends on knowing whether and how cognitive states can influence perception. All sixteen chapters were written especially for the book. T...
Cognitive Penetrability of Perception
The issue of the cognitive impenetrability or penetrability of perception lay dormant for a long period of time. Though philosophers reacted to the relativism implied by the work of Hanson, Kuhn, and Feyerabend, they concentrated their efforts in dealing with the danger of the incommensurability of theories. They tried to show by philosophical and detailed historical analysis that scientists within different paradigms do communicate with each other and put their respective theories to the empirical test. Curiously enough the same philosophers did not seek to examine the very foundation of the relativistic trend, namely the thesis that perception is cognitively penetrable and theory-laden. In...
Consciousness and Perceptual Experience
This book describes and proposes an unusual integrative approach to human perception that qualifies as both an ecological and a phenomenological approach at the same time. Thomas Natsoulas shows us how our consciousness - in three of six senses of the word that the book identifies - is involved in our activity of perceiving the one and only world that exists, which includes oneself as a proper part of it, and that all of us share together with the rest of life on earth. He makes the case that our stream of consciousness - in the original Jamesian sense minus his mental/physical dualism - provides us with firsthand contact with the world, as opposed to our having such contact instead with theorist-posited items such as inner mental representations, internal pictures, or sense-image models, pure figments and virtual objects, none of which can have effects on our sensory receptors.
