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This book presents a comprehensive view of recent developments in the theory of international trade agreements and political economy, by focusing on research by Raymond Riezman. This pioneering work introduced terms of trade effects and strategic behavior to the theory of international trade agreements. This is complemented by a careful analysis of how politics affects international trade agreements. The book brings together work which focuses on the question of why international trade agreements occur and what forms they take.
This book brings together cutting edge contributions in the fields of international economics, micro theory, welfare economics and econometrics, with contributions from Donald R. Davis, Avinash K. Dixit, Tadashi Inoue, Ronald W. Jones, Dale W. Jorgenson, K. Rao Kadiyala, Murray C. Kemp, Kenneth M. Kletzer, Anne O. Krueger, Mukul Majumdar, Daniel McFadden, Lionel McKenzie, James R. Melvin, James C. Moore, Takashi Negishi, Yoshihiko Otani, Raymond Riezman, Paul A. Samuelson, Joaquim Silvestre and Marie Thursby.
This volume contains papers on Economic Theory and International Trade: The papers on Economic Theory cover the existence and structure of competitive equilibrium in various settings: non-convexities, non-transitivity of preferences, and absence of differentiability or free-disposal assumptions, the role of the compensating variation as a welfare measure, oligopoly under bounded rationality, and regulation of a public utility. The papers on International Trade offer analyses of the "Dutch disease" or the Atlantic Slave Trade, or treat the influence of economic growth on import demand, the terms of trade, and other economic variables, as well as theoretical and empirical evidence for the validity of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. The papers, rigorous and often requiring mathematical sophistication, variously reflect Trout Rader's work.
This volume contains papers on Economic Theory and International Trade: The papers on Economic Theory cover the existence and structure of competitive equilibrium in various settings: non-convexities, non-transitivity of preferences, and absence of differentiability or free-disposal assumptions, the role of the compensating variation as a welfare measure, oligopoly under bounded rationality, and regulation of a public utility. The papers on International Trade offer analyses of the "Dutch disease" or the Atlantic Slave Trade, or treat the influence of economic growth on import demand, the terms of trade, and other economic variables, as well as theoretical and empirical evidence for the validity of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. The papers, rigorous and often requiring mathematical sophistication, variously reflect Trout Rader's work.
We discuss metrics of globalization for individual economies as distance measures between fully integrated and trade restricted equilibria in economies initially operating under less than full integration with the global economy. Such metrics can be used to construct country globalization metrics reflecting the distance of economies from full global integration due to trade barriers, barriers to factor flows, barriers to international financial intermediation, solved technological diffusion and other economy specific features yielding less than full integration into the global economy. Many distance metrics present themselves and none are wholly satisfactory since they each behave differently across various displacements from integration. Distance measures can, for instance, be small in goods space but large in price space. We present alternative measures constructed for eight OECD economies and comment in a concluding section on other measures used elsewhere in the literature such as trade / GDP ratios.
This paper seeks to contribute to discussion of the reasonableness of sometimes seemingly innocent assumptions used in theoretical trade models that the direction of trade is both predetermined for each good for each country and fixed. Here, we provide computational evidence as to the reasonableness of this assumption. We consider a simple three-country, three-good, pure-exchange model with CES preferences. We compute free trade competitive equilibria, three-country non-cooperative Nash equilibria, and customs union equilibria for randomized parameterizations, and find that trade patterns change in around 35% of the cases between free trade and customs union equilibria. In three-country Nash and customs unions comparisons trade patterns change roughly 40% of the time. We evaluate alternative cases, including with different numbers of randomizations in the parameter space. Results remain robust, reinforcing our conclusion that the assumption of unchanged trade pattern changes, common in theoretical analysis, does not have firm numerical support in the cases we consider.