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This account of the Pearl Harbor attack denies that the lack of preparation resulted from military negligence or a political plot
In the heady days of the Cold War, when the Bomb loomed large in the ruminations of Washington’s wise men, policy intellectuals flocked to the home of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter to discuss deterrence and doomsday. The Cold World They Made takes a fresh look at the original power couple of strategic studies. Seeking to unravel the complex tapestry of the Wohlstetters’ world and worldview, Ron Robin reveals fascinating insights into an unlikely husband-and-wife pair who, at the height of the most dangerous military standoff in history, gained access to the deepest corridors of American power. The author of such classic Cold War treatises as “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Albert ...
Pioneers of nuclear-age policy analysis, Albert Wohlstetter (1913-1997) and Roberta Wohlstetter (1912-2007) emerged as two of America's most consequential, innovative and controversial strategists. Through the clarity of their thinking, the rigor of their research, and the persistence of their personalities, they were able to shape the views and aid the decisions of Democratic and Republican policy makers both during and after the Cold War. Although the Wohlstetters' strategic concepts and analytical methods continue to be highly influential, no book has brought together their most important essays--until now.
This publication is an edited volume of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetters' key writings relating to nuclear proliferation and national security affairs, with commentaries by the Wohlstetters' colleagues and students. It also serves as a testament to the continuing relevance of the work of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter in the fields of nuclear and security policy analysis. Albert and Roberta wrote hundreds of articles and studies on U.S. policy on the Balkans, as well as the Persian Gulf; strategic command and control; intelligence and warning; NATO nuclear planning; U.S.-Russian arms control; strategic and theater missile defenses; the economics and military dangers of civilian nuclear energy...
Pioneers of nuclear-age policy analysis, Albert Wohlstetter (1913-1997) and Roberta Wohlstetter (1912-2007) emerged as two of America's most consequential, innovative and controversial strategists. Through the clarity of their thinking, the rigor of their research, and the persistence of their personalities, they were able to shape the views and aid the decisions of Democratic and Republican policy makers both during and after the Cold War. Although the Wohlstetters' strategic concepts and analytical methods continue to be highly influential, no book has brought together their most important published and unpublished essays--until now.
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Machine generated contents note: -- Contents -- Introduction -- Part One: The Theoretical Framework -- Chapter I. Surprise Attack: A Framework for Discussion -- Chapter II. Examining the Learning Process -- Part Two: The Empirical Evidence -- The First Dyad: Barbarossa and the Battle for Moscow -- Case Study I: The Failure -- Case Study II: Success: The Battle for Moscow -- The Second Dyad: The USA in the Korean War -- Case study I: Failing to Forecast the War -- Case Study II: Failure II: The Chinese Intervention of Fall 1950 -- The Third Dyad: Intelligence Failure and Success in the War of Yom Kippur -- Case Study I: The Failure -- Case Study II: The Success -- Chapter VI. Conclusions
This publication is an edited volume of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetters' key writings relating to nuclear proliferation and national security affairs, with commentaries by the Wohlstetters' colleagues and students. It also serves as a testament to the continuing relevance of the work of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter in the fields of nuclear and security policy analysis. Albert and Roberta wrote hundreds of articles and studies on U.S. policy on the Balkans, as well as the Persian Gulf; strategic command and control; intelligence and warning; NATO nuclear planning; U.S.-Russian arms control; strategic and theater missile defenses; the economics and military dangers of civilian nuclear energy...
Using previously unreleased documents, the author reveals new evidence that FDR knew the attack on Pearl Harbor was coming and did nothing to prevent it.