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New Paradigm Psychology of Reasoning
In recent years the psychology of reasoning has undergone radical change, which can only be seen as a Kuhn-style scientific revolution. This shift has been dubbed ‘New Paradigm’. For years, psychologists of reasoning focused on binary truth values and regarded the influence of belief as a bias. In contrast to this, the new paradigm puts probabilities, and subjective degrees of belief, centre stage. It also emphasises subjective psychological value, or utility; the way we reason within our own social environment (‘social pragmatics’); and the crucial role of dual process theories. Such theories distinguish between fast, intuitive processes, and effortful processes which enable hypothe...
The Science of Reason
This volume is a state-of-the-art survey of the psychology of reasoning, based around, and in tribute to, one of the field’s most eminent figures: Jonathan St B.T. Evans. In this collection of cutting edge research, Evans’ collaborators and colleagues review a wide range of important and developing areas of inquiry. These include biases in thinking, probabilistic and causal reasoning, people’s use of ‘if’ sentences in arguments, the dual-process theory of thought, and the nature of human rationality. These foundational issues are examined from various angles and finally integrated in a concluding panoramic chapter written by Evans himself. The eighteen chapters, all written by leading international researchers, combine state-of the-art research with investigation into the most fundamental questions surrounding human mental life, such as: What is the architecture of the human mind? Are humans rational, and what is the nature of this rationality? How do we think hypothetically? The Science of Reason offers a unique combination of breadth, depth and integrative vision, making it an indispensable resource for researchers and students of human reason.
Logic and Uncertainty in the Human Mind
David E. Over is a leading cognitive scientist and, with his firm grounding in philosophical logic, he also exerts a powerful influence on the psychology of reasoning. He is responsible for not only a large body of empirical work and accompanying theory, but for advancing a major shift in thinking about reasoning, commonly known as the ‘new paradigm’ in the psychology of human reasoning. Over’s signature mix of philosophical logic and experimental psychology has inspired generations of researchers, psychologists, and philosophers alike over more than a quarter of a century. The chapters in this volume, written by a leading group of contributors including a number who helped shape the p...
Cognitive Unconscious and Human Rationality
Examining the role of implicit, unconscious thinking on reasoning, decision making, problem solving, creativity, and its neurocognitive basis, for a genuinely psychological conception of rationality. This volume contributes to a current debate within the psychology of thought that has wide implications for our ideas about creativity, decision making, and economic behavior. The essays focus on the role of implicit, unconscious thinking in creativity and problem solving, the interaction of intuition and analytic thinking, and the relationship between communicative heuristics and thought. The analyses move beyond the conventional conception of mind informed by extra-psychological theoretical mo...
From Is to Ought: The Place of Normative Models in the Study of Human Thought
In the study of human thinking, two main research questions can be asked: “Descriptive Q: What is human thinking like? Normative Q: What ought human thinking be like?” For decades, these two questions have dominated the field, and the relationship between them generated many a controversy. Empirical normativist approaches regard the answers to these questions as positively correlated – in essence, human thinking is what it ought to be (although what counts as the ‘ought’ standard is moot). In contemporary theories of reasoning and decision making, this is often associated with a Panglossian framework, an adaptationist approach which regards human thinking as a priori rational. In c...
Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief
The book offers new insights into the lottery paradox, and thereby into how categorical and graded beliefs are formally connected.
The Handbook of Rationality
The first reference on rationality that integrates accounts from psychology and philosophy, covering descriptive and normative theories from both disciplines. Both analytic philosophy and cognitive psychology have made dramatic advances in understanding rationality, but there has been little interaction between the disciplines. This volume offers the first integrated overview of the state of the art in the psychology and philosophy of rationality. Written by leading experts from both disciplines, The Handbook of Rationality covers the main normative and descriptive theories of rationality—how people ought to think, how they actually think, and why we often deviate from what we can call rat...
Reasoning, Rationality and Dual Processes
In the World Library of Psychologists series, international experts themselves present career-long collections of what they judge to be their finest pieces - extracts from books, key articles, salient research findings, and their major theoretical and practical contributions. Jonathan St B T Evans is amongst the foremost cognitive psychologists of his generation, having been influential in spearheading developments in the psychological study of reasoning from its very beginnings in the 1970s up to the present day. This volume of self-selected papers recognises Professor Evan’s major contribution to the psychological study of thinking and reasoning by bringing together his most influential ...
The Neuroscience and Psychophysiology of Experience-Based Decisions
In experience-based decisions people learn to make decisions by sampling the relevant alternatives and getting feedback. The study of experience-based decisions has recently revealed some robust regularities that differ from how people make decisions based on descriptions. For example, people were found to underweight small probability events in experience-based decisions, while overweighting them in decisions based on descriptions (i.e. where the participants have full information about the outcome distributions but no feedback). This is now commonly referred to as the description-experience gap. In parallel to the recent advancement in Decision Science, neuroscientists have for a long whil...
