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We derive three testable predictions from a bank-P2P lender model of competition: (i) P2P lending grows when some banks are faced with exogenously higher regulatory costs, (ii) P2P loans are riskier than bank loans; and (iii) the risk-adjusted interest rates on P2P-loans are lower than those on bank loans. We confront these predictions with data on P2P loans and the consumer bank credit market in Germany and find empirical support. Overall, our analysis indicates the P2P lenders are bottom fishing, especially when regulatory shocks create a competitive disadvantage for some banks. Keywords: P2P lending, bank lending, competition.
This paper documents the features of a new database that focuses on changes in the intensity in the usage of several widely used prudential tools, taking into account both macro-prudential and micro-prudential objectives. The database coverage is broad, spanning 64 countries, and with quarterly data for the period 2000Q1 through 2014Q4. The five types of prudential instruments in the database are: capital buffers, interbank exposure limits, concentration limits, loan to value (LTV) ratio limits, and reserve requirements. A total of nine prudential tools are constructed since some useful further decompositions are presented, with capital buffers divided into four subindices: general capital r...
When central banks provide unlimited liquidity, eligible collateral assets become more valuable for banks with greater need of liquidity. Since eligible collateral assets are traded over the counter, banks that are more dependent on central bank funding face price discrimination and incur the fire buy premium. Because the risk-shifting channel is open, banks pay a higher premium for lower-rated collateral assets. Using the full fixed-income trading book of German banks, I identify each trade of each bank and investigate how unlimited liquidity provisions affect prices. Expenditures with the fire-buy premium amounted to, on average, 3.2% of banks' balance sheets.