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Seemings
This volume presents new research on the epistemology of seemings. It features original essays by leading epistemologists on the nature and epistemic import of seemings and intuitions. Seemings and intuitions are often appealed to in philosophical theorizing. In fact, epistemological theories such as phenomenal conservatism and dogmatism give pride of place to seemings. Such views insist that seemings are of central importance to theories of epistemic justification. However, there are many questions about seemings that have yet to be answered satisfactorily. What kinds of seemings are there? How do seemings justify? Are seemings connected to truth? Do they play a significant role in inquiry? The chapters in this volume offer a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas about seemings, the nature of justification and evidential support, intuitions, inquiry, and the nature of inference. Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in epistemology and philosophy of mind.
Misinformation, Content Moderation, and Epistemology
This book argues that misinformation poses a multifaceted threat to knowledge, while arguing that some forms of content moderation risk exacerbating these threats. It proposes alternative forms of content moderation that aim to address this complexity while enhancing human epistemic agency. The proliferation of fake news, false conspiracy theories, and other forms of misinformation on the internet and especially social media is widely recognized as a threat to individual knowledge and, consequently, to collective deliberation and democracy itself. This book argues that misinformation presents a three-pronged threat to knowledge. While researchers often focus on the role of misinformation in ...
Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
Challenges the idea that knowledge of a conclusion requires knowledge of essential premises, a widely accepted concept in epistemology.
Trust Responsibly
This book offers a defence of Wrightean epistemic entitlement, one of the most prominent approaches to hinge epistemology. It also systematically explores the connections between virtue epistemology and hinge epistemology. According to hinge epistemology, any human belief set is built within and upon a framework of pre-evidential propositions – hinges – that cannot be justified. Epistemic entitlement argues that we are entitled to trust our hinges. But there remains a problem. Entitlement is inherently unconstrained and arbitrary: We can be entitled to any hinge proposition under the right circumstances. In this book, the author argues that we need a non-arbitrariness clause that protect...
The Epistemic Injustice of Genocide Denialism
The injustice of genocide denial is commonly understood as a violation of the dignity of victims, survivors, and their descendants, and further described as an assault on truth and memory. This book rethinks the normative relationship between dignity, truth, and memory in relation to genocide denial by adopting the framework of epistemic injustice. This framework performs two functions. First, it introduces constructive normative vocabulary into genocide scholarship through which we can gain a better understanding of the normative impacts of genocide denial when it is institutionalized and systematic. Second, it develops and enriches current scholarship on epistemic injustice with a further,...
Rationality in Context
This book uses the psychological literature on rationality to weigh in on the recent debate between virtue epistemologists and epistemic situationists. It argues that both sides have misconstrued the literature and that an interactionist framework is needed to square epistemic theory with empirical facts about reasoning and inference. The explosion of empirical literature on human rationality has led to seismic shifts across a multitude of academic disciplines. This book considers its implications for epistemology. In particular, it critically evaluates the treatment of the rationality literature within the recent controversy between virtue epistemologists, who attempt to ground knowledge in...
Learning from Our Mistakes
In Learning from Our Mistakes: Epistemology for the Real World, William J. Talbott provides a new framework for understanding the history of Western epistemology and uses it to propose a new way of understanding rational belief that can be applied to pressing social and political issues. Thisframework is used to articulate a new theory of prejudice and a new diagnosis of the sources of inequity in the U.S. criminal justice system, as well as insight into the proliferation of tribal and fascist epistemologies based on alt-facts and alt-truth.Talbott's new model of rational belief is not a model of a theorem prover in mathematics - It is a model of a good learner. Being a good learner requires...
Explaining Knowledge
The "Gettier Problem" has shaped most of the fundamental debates in epistemology for more than fifty years. Before Edmund Gettier published his famous 1963 paper (reprinted in this volume), it was generally presumed that knowledge was equivalent to true belief supported by adequate evidence.Gettier presented a powerful challenge to that presumption. These led to the development and refinement of many prominent epistemological theories: internalism, externalism, evidentialism, reliabilism, and virtue epistemology. The debate about the appropriate use of intuition as providing evidencein all areas of philosophy began as a debate about the epistemic status of the "Gettier intuition". The differ...
Perceiving the World
Essays by top philosophers on the theme of perception, among them Jesse Prinz, Fred Dretske, Susanna Siegel, and Benj Hellie. Original content explores new ideas and will develop older ones in innovative ways
Evidence and Agency
Evidence and Agency is concerned with the question of how, as agents, we should take evidence into account when thinking about our future actions. Suppose you are promising or resolving to do something that you have evidence is difficult for you to do. For example, suppose you are promising to be faithful for the rest of your life, or you are resolving to quit smoking. Should you believe that you will follow through, or should you believe that there is a good chance that you won't? If you believe the former, you seem to be irrational since you believe against the evidence. Yet if you believe the latter, you seem to be insincere since you can't sincerely say that you will follow through. Henc...
