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Banking sector problems have plagued over 130 of the IMF's member countries since 1980. Developing and industrial market economies alike have been affected, as have all the economies in transition. This volume, by Carl-Johan Lindgren, Gillian Garcia, and Matthew I. Saal, discusses the linkages between macroeconomic policy and bank soundness. It takes a global view of the causes and consequences of banking sector problems and discussses how the banking system can be strengthened, nationally and internationally.
A valuable collection of papers illustrating Akerlof's 'modern', Nobel Prize-winning methodology at work. This ovlume covers the economics of information, the theory of unemployment, the demand for money, psychology and economics, and the nature of discrimination.
Since banking systems play a crucial role in maintaining the overall health of the economy, the adverse effects of poorly supervised systems may be quite severe. Without some form of vigilant external oversight, banking systems could fall prey to excessive risk taking, moral hazard, and corruption. Prudential supervision provides that oversight, using government regulation and monitoring to ensure the soundness of the banking system and, by extension, the economy at large. The contributors to this thoughtful volume examine the current state of prudential supervision, focusing on fundamental issues and key pragmatic concerns. Why is prudential supervision so important? What kinds of excess must it guard against? What particular forms does it take? Which of these are the most effective deterrents against mismanagement and system overload in today's rapidly shifting financial climate? The contributors foresee a continued movement beyond simple regulatory rules in banking and toward a more active evaluation and supervision of a bank's risk management practices.
This paper tests empirically the proposition that bank fragility is determined by bank-specific factors, macroeconomic conditions and potential contagion effects. The methodology allows for the variables that determine bank failure to differ from those that influence banks’ time to failure (or survival rate). Based on the indicators of fragility of individual banks, we construct an index of fragility for the banking system. The framework is applied to the Mexican financial crisis beginning in 1994. In the case of Mexico, bank-specific variables as well as contagion effects explain the likelihood of bank failure, while macroeconomic variables largely determine the timing of failure.
Schmidtz and Goodin debate the ethical merits of individual versus collective responsibility for welfare.