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Part of a series examining the technology competition between security organizations and terrorist organizations, this report focuses on understanding how terrorist groups make technology choices and consequently how the United States can discourage their adoption of advanced conventional weapons. Five types of advanced conventional weapons are identified that could provide terrorists with a new and qualitatively different weapon capability: sniper rifles, squad-level weapons, antitank missiles, large limpet mines, and mortar systems. Two key methods of limiting the threat from these systems i.
In the violent world of radical extremists, "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." This study reveals how that precept plays out in the unexpected bonding between militant Islam and the extreme right in America and Europe. It provides an insightful and sane look at the possibilities for collaboration between these groups.
In-depth case studies of twelve terrorist groups and individuals who, from 1946 to 1998, allegedly acquired or employed CBW agents. Policymakers, scholars, and the news media have been alarmed by the potential for chemical and biological weapons (CBW) terrorism, and the U.S. Congress has allocated billions of dollars for counterterrorism and "consequence management" programs. Driving these concerns are the global spread of scientific knowledge and technology relevant to CBW terrorism and the vulnerability of civilian populations to chemical and biological attacks. Notably lacking from the analysis, however, has been a careful assessment of the terrorists themselves. What types of terrorist g...
Case studies of 11 terrorist groups in Mindanao, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and southwest Colombia show how these groups have exchanged technologies and knowledge in an effort to innovate (i.e., improve their operational capabilities). The analysis provides national security policymakers with insight into the innovation process and suggests ways that government policies can create barriers to terrorists' adoption of new technologies.
In an analysis grounded in the observation that although Iranian power projection is marked by strengths, it also has serious liabilities and limitations, this report surveys the nature of both in four critical areas and offers a new U.S. policy paradigm that seeks to manage the challenges Iran presents through the exploitation of regional barriers to its power and sources of caution in the regime?s strategic calculus.
This timely book contains excerpts from authoritative testimony, speeches and reports of political leaders, members of Congress, and leading experts who lay out a roadmap for understanding the nation's growing concern and response to the threat of super terrorism. It highlights warnings on the domestic and international threat form reports of the Bremer Commission, Gilmore Commission, Hart-Rudman Commission, Baker-Cutler Report and the USS Cole Commission. The text features statements and assessments of Madeleine Albright, Ahmed Al-Fadl, Ken Alibek, Seth Carus, Bill Clinton, Anthony Cordesman, John Deutch, Louis Freeh, Donald Henderson, Joshua Lederberg, Sam Nunn, John Parachini, Janet Reno, George Tenet and others. Published under the Transnational Publishers imprint.
Limited resources, access, and incomplete knowledge of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats create a need for working with appropriate partner countries around the world to address these challenging threats. This monograph outlines and then applies a four-step process for developing regional approaches to building partner capacity (BPC) to combat WMD.
The author presents a clear-sighted and sobering analysis of where we are today in the struggle against terrorism. Jenkins, an internationally renowned authority on terrorism, distills the jihadists' operational code and outlines a pragmatic but principled approach to defeating the terrorist enterprise. We need to build upon our traditions of determination and self-reliance, he argues, and above all, preserve our commitment to American values.
This study explores the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the key challenges and successes of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign, and the capabilities necessary to wage effective counterinsurgency operations. By examining the key lessons from all insurgencies since World War II, it finds that most policymakers repeatedly underestimate the importance of indigenous actors to counterinsurgency efforts. The U.S. should focus its resources on helping improve the capacity of the indigenous government and indigenous security forces to wage counterinsurgency. It has not always done this well. The U.S. military-along with U.S. civilian agencies and other coalition partners-is more likely to be successful in counterinsurgency warfare the more capable and legitimate the indigenous security forces (especially the police), the better the governance capacity of the local state, and the less external support that insurgents receive.
Deterrence--a central feature of counterterrorism security systems and a major factor in the cost-effectiveness of many security programs--is not well understood or measured. This paper offers a framework for understanding how security systems may deter or displace attacks and how to measure the relative deterrent value of alternative systems. This framework may aid in attempts to achieve increased security benefits with limited resources.