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The Theory of Implementation of Socially Optimal Decisions in Economics
Since the early seventies, following the pioneering work by Leo Hurwicz, economists have been studying the relationship between socially optimal goals and private self-interest. The task was to reconcile the Utopian and Hobbesian traditions, using game theory to find ways to organise the society that are both socially optimal and incentive compatible. This book provides a succinct and up-to-date account of this vast literature and will be welcomed by students, lecturers and anyone wishing to update their knowledge of the field.
Theories of Imperfectly Competitive Markets
One of the most fascinating debates of our times is the discussion over the merits and capabilities of market economies. Very often, one sees strong endorsements to the idea that markets provide an efficient way of allocating resources. Some years ago, opposite views on this issue used to be very popular (at least in Europe) and were held by similarly qualified people. In my opinion, the contribution of economics to this question can not be dismissed on the grounds that economics still in its infancy and that this question is a "practical" one (whatever this means). Economics started with similar naive ideas, two hundred years ago. In particular it has taken a long time to realize that compe...
Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II
This second volume of the Handbook includes original contribution by experts in the field. It provides up-to-date surveys of the most relevant applications of game theory to industrial organization. The book covers both classical as well as new IO topics such as mergers in markets with homogeneous and differentiated goods, leniency and coordinated effects in cartels and mergers, static and dynamic contests, consumer search and product safety, strategic delegation, platforms and network effects, auctions, environmental and resource economics, intellectual property, healthcare, corruption, experimental industrial organization and empirical models of R&D.
Nobel Lectures In Economic Sciences (2006-2010)
In 1968, Sveriges Riksbank (Sweden's central bank) established the Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, founder of the Nobel Prize. The Prize in Economic Sciences is awarded by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Stockholm, according to the same principles as for the Nobel Prizes that have been awarded since 1901. This volume is a collection of the Nobel lectures delivered by the prizewinners, together with their biographies and the presentation speeches, for the period 2006-2010.List of prizewinners and their award citations:(2006) Edmund S Phelps — for his analysis of intertemporal tradeoffs in macroeconomic policy;(2007) Leonid Hurwicz, Eric S Maskin and Roger B Myerson — for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory;(2008) Paul Krugman — for his analysis of trade patterns and location of economic activity;(2009) Elinor Ostrom — for her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons, and Oliver E Williamson — for his analysis of economic governance, especially the boundaries of the firm;(2010) Peter A Diamond, Dale T Mortensen and Christopher A Pissarides — for their analysis of markets with search frictions.
Contests
Contest theory is an important part of game theory used to analyse different types of contests and conflicts. Traditional microeconomic models focus on situations where property rights are well defined, and agents voluntarily trade rights over goods or produce rights for new goods. However, much less focus has been given to other situations where agents do not trade property rights, but rather fight over them. Contests: Theory and Applications presents a state-of-the art discussion of the economics of contests from the perspective of both core theory and applications. It provides a new approach to standard topics in labour, education, welfare and development and introduces areas like voting, industrial organisation, mechanism design, sport, and military conflict. Using elementary mathematics, this book provides a versatile framework for navigating this growing area of study and serves as an essential resource for its wide variety of applications in economics and political science.
Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I
The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main game-theoretic tools commonly used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, learning and information sharing models.
A Decent Proposal
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Big Data and the Abuse of Dominance by Multi-Sided Platforms
Der Autor untersucht interdisziplinär, inwieweit Art. 102 AEUV geeignet ist, den Wettbewerb vor dem missbräuchlichen Verhalten marktbeherrschender Plattformen zu schützen. Nach einer ersten Erörterung der Grundlagen der digitalen Wirtschaft, insbesondere Big Data und mehrseitige Plattformen, werden die relevanten Konzepte, die von EU-Kommission und EU-Gerichten in ihrer Entscheidungspraxis zur Auslegung von Art. 102 AEUV entwickelt wurden, näher beleuchtet, um ihre Eignung für das Missbrauchsverbot mit Blick auf Plattformbetreiber vor dem Hintergrund der Besonderheiten mehrseitiger Märkte zu bewerten. Auch das Vorhandensein und die Abgrenzung eines Datenmarktes werden diskutiert.
Market definition and market power in the platform economy
With the rise of digital platforms and the natural tendency of markets involving platforms to become concentrated, competition authorities and courts are more frequently in a position to investigate and decide merger and abuse cases that involve platforms. This report provides guidance on how to define markets and on how to assess market power when dealing with two-sided platforms. DEFINITION Competition authorities and courts are well advised to uniformly use a multi-markets approach when defining markets in the context of two-sided platforms. The multi-markets approach is the more flexible instrument compared to the competing single-market approach that defines a single market for both sid...
