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The Fog of Peace and War Planning
How do we plan under conditions of uncertainty? The perspective of military planners is a key organizing framework: do they see themselves as preparing to administer a peace, or preparing to fight a future war? Most interwar volumes examine only the 1920s and the 1930s. This new volume goes back, and forward in time, to draw on a greater expanse of history in order to tease out lessons for contemporary planners. These chapters are grouped into four periods: 1815-1856, 1871-1914, 1918-1938, and post-Second World War. They progress from low-tech to high-tech concerns, for example, the first period examines armies, while the second period examines navies, the third asseses navies combined with air forces, and finally for the Kaiser chapter explores nuclear issues and decision-making.
Blueprints for Battle
While scholarship abounds on the diplomatic and security aspects of the Cold War, very little attention has been paid to military planning at the operational level. In Blueprints for Battle, experts from Russia, the United States, and Europe address this dearth by closely examining the military planning of NATO and Warsaw Pact member nations from the end of World War II to the beginning of détente. Informed by material from recently opened archives, this collection investigates the perceptions and actions of the rival coalitions, exploring the challenges presented by nuclear technology, examining how military commanders' perceptions changed from the 1950s to the 1960s, and discussing logistical coordination among allied states. The result is a detailed study that offers much-needed new perspectives on the military aspects of the early Cold War.
Military Planning in the Twentieth Century
The essays, commentaries, and speeches which form this volume were presented at the Eleventh Military History Symposium at the United States Air Force Academy. Few events traumatize a nation more than losing a war. Defeat can bring down an empire, alter national boundaries, end sovereignty, and dramatically change a societys social structure. Failures are explained in many ways and are seldom of a singular nature. Their roots, however, can be traced to the planning for war. For this reason, no other peacetime activity should command more attention from military leaders and scholars than the study of military planning. In reality, commanders prefer to concentrate on more immediate and understandable concerns supplying, training, and fighting. Military historians also prefer to study combat and the battlefield where the results of all efforts are starkly evident. Consequently, the Department of History decided to dedicate its Eleventh Military History Symposium to the too seldom studied topic of military planning, the foundation for successful warfare.
Military Planning in the Twentieth Century
The essays, commentaries, and speeches which form this volume were presented at the Eleventh Military History Symposium, held at the United States Air Force Academy on l0-l2 October 1984. This conference is a biennial event sponsored jointly by the Department of History and the Association of Graduates of the United States Air Force Academy. Begun in 1967, the series seeks to address problems in military history which have received limited attention and to provide a forum in which scholars may present the results of their research. In this manner we hope to stimulate and encourage interest in military history among civilian and military scholars, members of the armed forces, and the cadets of the United States Air Force Academy.
Military Planning in the Twentieth Century
The essays, commentaries, and speeches which form this volume were presented at the Eleventh Military History Symposium, held at the United States Air Force Academy on 10-12 October 1984. This conference is a biennial event sponsored jointly by the Department of History and the Association of Graduates of the United States Air Force Academy. Begun in 1967, the series seeks to address problems in military history which have received limited attention and to provide a forum in which scholars may present the results of their research. In this manner we hope to stimulate and encourage interest in military history among civilian and military scholars, members of the armed forces, and the cadets of the United States Air Force Academy.
Military Planning for the Defense of the United Kingdom, 1814-1870
Based upon exhaustive research in numerous archival sources, including the personal papers of the major British military and political leaders of the day, this is a comprehensive study of British military planning during a period in which long-successful defense and military strategies had to be reappraised in light of new technological advances. As Michael Partridge notes, Britain emerged victorious in 1814 after twenty-two years of war with revolutionary and Napoleonic France; however various technical and international developments--particularly the invention of the steam engine--gravely undermined Britain's security between 1814 and 1870. Because steam power enabled ships to maneuver ind...
An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present
From United States GPO Bookstore website: Describes the planning process that Major Albert Coady Wedemeyer used in the summer of 1941 to write the plan that became the outline for mobilization and operations during World War 2. Includes an appendix, "The Army Portion of the Victory Plan, Ultimate Requirements Study, Estimate of Ground Forces."
British Military Planning for the Defence of Germany 1945–50
Using recently released archive material, British Military Planning for the Defence of Germany, 1945-50, reassesses Britain's strategy for the defence of Germany up to the outbreak of the Korean War. Convinced of the capabilities of strategic air power with atomic weapons, and convinced that the defence of the Middle East should be the first call on British planning, Britain's military chiefs made a series of token gestures designed to boost French morale and consistently refused to make a genuine 'continental commitment' of operational troops.
An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present
CMH Pub. 93-10. 1st printing. On cover: World War 2 50th Anniversary Commemorative Edition. Spine title reads: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941. Describes the planning process that Major Albert Coady Wedemeyer used in the summer of 1941 to write the plan that became the outline for mobilization and operations during World War 2. Includes an appendix, "The Army Portion of the Victory Plan, Ultimate Requirements Study, Estimate of Ground Forces." Also includes photographs, footnotes, a bibliography, and an index.
