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Estudio donde se reproduce un modelo de negociación de salarios en oligopolios industriales a través de una centralización de distintas representaciones sindicales; se muestra que factores económicos, tales como tecnología y negociación generan distintos grados de centralización.
The paper explores the political economy of the 'minimum-wage institution (MWI)' in an internationally integrated product market. The authors consider a two-sector Economic Union (EU) with a perfectly competitive agricultural sector and a unionized oligopolistic manufacturing sector in which there exist productivity asymmetries across firms. It is shown that efficient firms have an incentive to strategically opt for intercountry minimum-wage agreements high enough to raise their inefficient rivals' costs and thus gain business in equilibrium. The unions of workers in all countries also find these agreements in their best interest. As a consequence, the MWI may emerge as the equilibrium institutional resolution of alternative political processes (i.e., an EU-wide referendum or special-interest politics), despite its negative effect on aggregate employment.
By means of a field experiment we investigate whether low-skilled male Albanians face discrimination in the Greek labour market. To test for discrimination in occupational access, curriculum vitae which differed only in ethnicity were faxed to firms. The probability for Albanians to receive an interview is lower than for Greeks by 21.4 percentage points. Furthermore, by exploiting the informal wage and insurance coverage offers on the part of employers, we find a wage discrimination factor of 11 per cent against the Albanians, while their probability of being registered with insurance is 25.7 percentage points lower than that for Greeks.
This paper proposes labour market institutional arrangements as a strategic device to induce or deter export-substituting inward foreign direct investments (FDI) -- in either instance protecting domestic employment. In a union-oligopoly context it is shown that, if the FDI-associated unit costs (FC) are not high enough, then employment-neutral (-enhancing) inward FDI will emerge in equilibrium if the domestic wage setting is credibly centralized and the unemployment benefit is sufficiently high (low), each instance arising for a different range of -- intermediate -- FC values. If however the FC values are sufficiently high, then the centralized structure of wage setting along with a low enough unemployment benefit will deter employment-reducing inward FDI.
Scope: The classification of researchers and scientists in Greece in a unified list based on the citation impact and dissemination level of their scientific work according to Google Scholar database. Classification criteria: First criterion is h-index. In the case of equal h-index, the following scientometric indicators are used for the classification. The number of total citations, the i10-index, the total impact factor of scientist, the m-index or m-quotient of scientist. Information resource: The h-index, citations and i10-index derived from the public profiles of researchers in the Google Scholar database. In addition, the calculation of total impact factor and m-index of each researcher...
Novel collection of essays addressing contemporary trends in political science, covering a broad array of methodological and substantive topics.