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Fiscal Rules and the Sovereign Default Premium
This paper finds optimal fiscal rule parameter values and measures the effects of imposing fiscal rules using a default model calibrated to an economy that in the absence of a fiscal rule pays a significant sovereign default premium. The paper also studies the case in which the government conducts a voluntary debt restructuring to capture the capital gains from the increase in its debt market value implied by a rule announcement. In addition, the paper shows how debt ceilings may reduce the procyclicality of fiscal policy and thus consumption volatility.
Numerical Fiscal Rules for Economic Unions: the Role of Sovereign Spreads
We study gains from introducing a common numerical fiscal rule in a “Union” of model economies facing sovereign default risk. We show that among economies in the Union, there is significant disagreement about the common debt limit the Union should implement: the limit preferred by some economies can generate welfare losses in other economies. In contrast, a common sovereign spread limit results in higher welfare across economies in the Union.
Sovereign Debt
This paper surveys the literature on sovereign debt from the perspective of understanding how sovereign debt differs from privately issue debt, and why sovereign debt is deemed safe in some countries but risky in others. The answers relate to the unique power of the sovereign. One the one hand, a sovereign has the power to tax, making debt relatively safe; on the other, it also has control over its territory and most of its assets, making debt enforcement difficult. The paper discusses debt contracts and the sovereign debt market, sovereign debt restructurings, and the empirical and theoretical literatures on the costs and causes of defaults. It describes the adverse impact of sovereign default risk on the issuing countries and what explains this impact. The survey concludes with a discussion of policy options to reduce sovereign risk, including fiscal frameworks that act as commitment devices, state-contingent debt, and independent and credible monetary policy.
How Large is the Sovereign Greenium?
This paper assembles a comprehensive sovereign green bond database and estimates the sovereign greenium. The development of green bond markets has been one of the most important financial breakthroughs in the domain of sustainable finance during the last 15 years. A central benefit associated with green bonds has been that they exhibit a positive green premium (greenium), i.e., a lower yield relative to a similar conventional bond. Yet, issuances at the sovereign level have been relatively recent and not well documented in the literature. We find that green bonds are issued at a relatively small premium (4 basis points on average) in Advanced Economies. Yet, importantly, the greenium is growing over time and is considerably larger (11 basis points on average) for Emerging Market Economies.
Optimal Monetary and Macroprudential Policies Under Fire-Sale Externalities
I provide an integrated analysis of monetary and macroprudential policies in a model economy featuring a financial friction and a nominal wage rigidity. In this set-up, the monetary authority faces a trade-off between macroeconomic and financial stability: While expansionary counter-cyclical monetary policy prevents involuntary unemployment, it also amplifies an inefficient reallocation of capital across sectors. The main contribution of the analysis is threefold: First it highlights a novel channel through which monetary policy can impact financial stability. Second, it shows that, by itself, monetary policy can significantly mitigate the wedge between the constrained efficient and the competitive allocation. Third, regardless of the availability of macroprudential tools, stabilizing demand is usually not optimal for monetary policy.
Sovereign Cocos
We study a model of equilibrium sovereign default in which the government issues cocos (contingent convertible bonds) that stipulate a suspension of debt payments when the government faces liquidity shocks in the form of an increase of the bondholders' risk aversion. We find that in spite of reducing the frequency of defaults triggered by liquidity shocks, introducing cocos increases the overall default frequency. By mitigating concerns about liquidity, cocos make indebtedness and default risk more attractive for the government. In contrast, cocos that stipulate debt forgiveness when the government faces the shock, achieve larger welfare gains by reducing default risk.
The Dynamics of Sovereign Debt Crises and Bailouts
Motivated by the recent European debt crisis, this paper investigates the scope for a bailout guarantee in a sovereign debt crisis. Defaults may arise from negative income shocks, government impatience or a "sunspot"-coordinated buyers strike. We introduce a bailout agency, and characterize the minimal actuarially fair intervention that guarantees the no-buyers-strike fundamental equilibrium, relying on the market for residual financing. The intervention makes it cheaper for governments to borrow, inducing them borrow more, leaving default probabilities possibly rather unchanged. The maximal backstop will be pulled precisely when fundamentals worsen.
The Motives to Borrow
Governments issue debt for good and bad reasons. While the good reasons—intertemporal tax-smoothing, fiscal stimulus, and asset management—can explain some of the increases in public debt in recent years, they cannot account for all of the observed changes. Bad reasons for borrowing are driven by political failures associated with intergenerational transfers, strategic manipulation, and common pool problems. These political failures are a major cause of overborrowing though budgetary institutions and fiscal rules can play a role in mitigating governments’ tendencies to overborrow. While it is difficult to establish a clear causal link from high public debt to low output growth, it is likely that some countries pay a price—in terms of lower growth and greater output volatility—for excessive debt accumulation.
Public Debt Dynamics and the Impact of Fiscal Policy
Public debt-to-GDP ratios have undergone substantial fluctuations over both the short and long term. Most recently, global debt-to-GDP ratios peaked at 100% on average in 2020 due to COVID-19, retracting substantially by 2022. To understand what drives these movements, we propose a structural approach to debt decompositions based on a SVAR identified with narrative sign restrictions. We find that GDP growth shocks and the corresponding comovements of macroeconomic variables are the key drivers of debt to GDP, accounting for 40% of the observed yearly variation in 17 advanced economies since the 1980s. Discretionary fiscal policy changes, in turn, account for less than 20% of the observed changes. The analysis also finds the primary balance multiplier on GDP to be very small. We reconcile our results with the literature, underscoring the importance of accurate shock identification and accounting for cross-country heterogeneity.
Morocco's Quest for Stronger and Inclusive Growth
Throughout the past two decades, Morocco has faced several external and domestic shocks, including large swings in international oil prices, regional geopolitical tensions, severe droughts, and most recently the impact of the pandemic and the economic fallout from Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Despite rough waters, the government stayed the course and remained focused not only on immediate stability, but also on the long-term needs of the Moroccan economy. This involved the adoption of a series of difficult measures, like the elimination of energy subsidies, and a strategy aimed at improving the country's infrastructure, diversifying the production and export bases by attracting foreign inve...
