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Managing Systemic Banking Crises
This paper updates the IMF’s work on general principles, strategies, and techniques from an operational perspective in preparing for and managing systemic banking crises in light of the experiences and challenges faced during and since the global financial crisis. It summarizes IMF advice concerning these areas from staff of the IMF Monetary and Capital Markets Department (MCM), drawing on Executive Board Papers, IMF staff publications, and country documents (including program documents and technical assistance reports). Unless stated otherwise, the guidance is generally applicable across the IMF membership.
The Case for (and Against) Asset Management Companies in Banking Crises
This technical note explores the advantages and disadvantages of establishing state-sponsored centralized asset management companies (AMCs) to address high levels of bank asset distress during financial crises. AMCs may offer potential benefits like mitigating downward price spirals or achieving efficiency gains by consolidating creditor claims and scarce expertise. However, significant risks and costs warrant careful consideration. These include extreme uncertainties in asset valuation and substantial operational and financial risks. Past international experiences highlight the dangers of underestimating these risks, potentially turning the AMC into a mechanism for deferring losses to taxpayers, rather than minimizing them, and ultimately increasing long-term public costs and moral hazard. This technical note emphasizes these trade-offs and discusses crucial design elements for effective AMCs: a clear mandate, transfer pricing that prudently reflects asset values and disposal costs, strong governance with independent management, and efficient operational processes promoting transparency and accountability.
E-Money: Prudential Supervision, Oversight, and User Protection
This departmental paper discusses the evolving prudential frameworks for nonbank issuers of electronic money. Some jurisdictions take a relatively light-touch approach to regulating electronic money issuers (EMIs). Others have sought to apply more stringent requirements to protect electronic money (e-money) users, as the sector has grown in importance. The paper aims to build on previous IMF staff contributions to the literature and to draw policy conclusions for strengthening e-money regulatory regimes; in particular in jurisdictions where issuers, individually or collectively, have grown to a size to which they are of macro-financial importance (see below). Chapter 2 provides background on...
The Role for Deposit Insurance Funds in Dealing with Failing Banks in the European Union
This paper argues that in the European Union (EU) deposit insurance funds are too difficult to use in bank resolution and too easy to use outside resolution. The paper proposes reforms in three areas for the effective management of bank failures of small and medium-sized banks in the European Union: making resolution the norm for dealing with failing banks; establishing a common DIS for the European Union; and increasing funding and backstops for deposit insurance while removing constraints on their use for resolution measures. Without these changes, the European Union will continue to be challenged by banks that are too small for resolution and too large for liquidation.
Managing the Sovereign-Bank Nexus
This paper reviews empirical and theoretical work on the links between banks and their governments (the bank-sovereign nexus). How significant is this nexus? What do we know about it? To what extent is it a source of concern? What is the role of policy intervention? The paper concludes with a review of recent policy proposals.
The Case for Depositor Preference
This technical note and manual (TNM) addresses the following issues: advantages and disadvantages of different types of depositor preference, international best practice and experience in adopting depositor preference, and introducing depositor preference in jurisdictions with or without deposit insurance.
From Bail-out to Bail-in
Staff Discussion Notes showcase the latest policy-related analysis and research being developed by individual IMF staff and are published to elicit comment and to further debate. These papers are generally brief and written in nontechnical language, and so are aimed at a broad audience interested in economic policy issues. This Web-only series replaced Staff Position Notes in January 2011.
Systemic Banking Crises Database
We update the widely used banking crises database by Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2010) with new information on recent and ongoing crises, including updated information on policy responses and outcomes (i.e. fiscal costs, output losses, and increases in public debt). We also update our dating of sovereign debt and currency crises. The database includes all systemic banking, currency, and sovereign debt crises during the period 1970-2011. The data show some striking differences in policy responses between advanced and emerging economies as well as many similarities between past and ongoing crises.
Systemic Banking Crises Revisited
This paper updates the database on systemic banking crises presented in Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2013). Drawing on 151 systemic banking crises episodes around the globe during 1970-2017, the database includes information on crisis dates, policy responses to resolve banking crises, and the fiscal and output costs of crises. We provide new evidence that crises in high-income countries tend to last longer and be associated with higher output losses, lower fiscal costs, and more extensive use of bank guarantees and expansionary macro policies than crises in low- and middle-income countries. We complement the banking crises dates with sovereign debt and currency crises dates to find that sovereign debt and currency crises tend to coincide or follow banking crises.
