Welcome to our book review site go-pdf.online!
You may have to Search all our reviewed books and magazines, click the sign up button below to create a free account.
On Decay Centrality
None
Electoral Competition with Third Party Entry in the Lab
Electoral competition between two vote-share maximizing candidates in the context of the unidimensional spatial model leads to platform convergence: both candidates end up proposing the ideal policy of the median voter. Palfrey (1984) famously argued that if third candidate entry is expected after the two main candidates choose their platforms, the unique equilibrium is such that the two main candidates locate substantially far from each other. By conducting a laboratory experiment, we put this popular idea to test, for the first time. We allow entry to take place with a probability p in [0,1] and we find that, indeed, the degree of polarization of the two main candidates' platforms increases as third candidate entry becomes more likely to occur, providing strong evidence in support of Palfrey's (1984) formal results and underlying intuition.
Selten's Horse an Experiment on Sequential Rationality∗
In a seminal paper, Selten (Selten, 1975) developed the game Selten's Horse to illustrate some aspects of rationality. In our experimental study of Selten's Horse we find that behaviour is not according to conventional sequential rationality based refinements. Some behaviour is better explained by Ideal Reactive Equilibrium (Sadanand, 2019), an extension of Manipulated Nash Equilibrium (Amershi, Sadanand, and Sadanand, 1985a,b,c). We provide a simple model of Level-k thinking incorporating the idea of virtual observability, where the players behave as if their subsequent opponents could in effect observe their actions. We find that participants' behaviour is somewhat explained by virtual observability, but this is limited to immediate successors and is more prevalent in the more complex version of the game. Moreover, at times we see first movers na ̈ıvely move towards their most-preferred equilibrium and follower players anticipate and exploit it by systematically reaching off-equilibrium outcomes that are favourable to them.
Imitating the Most Successful Neighbor in Social Networks
We study a model of observational learning in a set of agents who are connected through a social network. The agents face identical decision problems under uncertainty, where they are not aware of the relative profitability of their alternative choices. They choose repeatedly from a common set of actions with uncertain payoffs and observe the actions chosen by their neighbors, as well as the payoffs that they received. In each period, they update their choice myopically, imitating the choice of their most successful neighbor in the preceding period. We show that in finite networks, regardless of the network structure, the population converges to a monomorphic steady state, i.e. one at which ...
Beatable Imitation in Symmetric Games with Perturbed Payoffs
In a recent paper, Duersch et.al (2012) showed that in a rather broad class of repeated symmetric two-player games, a player who uses the simple "imitate-if-better" heuristic cannot be subject to a money pump. In this paper, we extend the analysis to games with randomly perturbed payoffs and we show that this result is not robust to, even arbitrarily small, payoff perturbations. In particular, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition that characterizes the class of perturbed games in which the imitator can be subject to a money pump.
