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A Political Theory Primer
First published in 1992, A Political Theory Primer is designed as an introductory course for students in the application of game theory to modeling political processes. Examining those very phenomena that power political machineries--elections, legislative and committee processes, and international conflict--the book attempts to answer fundamental questions about their nature and function. Included at the end of each chapter is a set of exercises designed to allow students to practice the construction and analysis of political models. Although the text assumes only training at the basic algebra level, the student who completes a course around this text will be equipped to read nearly all the professional literature that makes use of game-theoretic analysis. Each chapter also contains suggestiosn for further reading for those students who want to broaden their learning and expertise.
Strategy and Politics
Strategy and Politics: An Introduction to Game Theory is designed to introduce students with no background in formal theory to the application of game theory to modeling political processes. This accessible text covers the essential aspects of game theory while keeping the reader constantly in touch with why political science as a whole would benefit from considering this method. Examining the very phenomena that power political machineries—elections, legislative and committee processes, and international conflict, the book attempts to answer fundamental questions about their nature and function in a clear, accessible manner. Included at the end of each chapter is a set of exercises designed to allow students to practice the construction and analysis of political models. Although the text assumes only an elementary-level training in algebra, students who complete a course around this text will be equipped to read nearly all of the professional literature that makes use of game theoretic analysis.
Designing Federalism
Because of the redistributive nature of institutions and the availability of implementable alternatives with different distributive consequences, the desire of federation members to change institutional specifics in their favor is a permanent feature of the federal political process. This is so for two reasons. First, states or their equivalents in democratic federations usually can succeed in renegotiating the rules if they feel sufficiently motivated to do so. Second, in the case of a federation it is more or less clear who stands to benefit from any change in institutions. Thus, the existence of an equilibrium of constitutional legitimacy at the popular and elite levels cannot be taken for granted. The authors show that the presence in the political process of agents who are 'naturally committed' to the status-quo institutional arrangement can suffice to coordinate voters to act as if they support existing constitutional arrangements.
The Forensics of Election Fraud
A forensics approach to detecting election fraud -- The fingerprints of fraud -- Russia -- Ukraine 2004 -- Ukraine 2006 and 2007 -- The United States.
Political Equilibrium: A Delicate Balance
Peter C. Ordeshook and Kenneth A. Shepsle If the inaugural date of modern economics is set at 1776 with the publication of Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations, then the analytical tradition in the study of politics is not even a decade younger, commencing nine years later with the publication of the Marquis de Condorcet's Essai sur l'application de l'analyse iz la probabilite des decisions rendues iz la pluralite des voix. The parallel, however, stops there for, unlike Smith and other classical economists who laid an intel lectual foundation upon which a century of cumulative scientific research pro ceeded, analytical political science suffered fits and starts. Condorcet, himself, acknowledge...
The Balance of Power
One of the fundamental issues of international relations concerns whether, and under what conditions, stability prevails in anarchic systems--systems in which all authority and institutional restraints to action are wholly endogenous. This book uses the tools provided by contemporary game theory to develop a comprehensive theory of such systems and details both necessary and sufficient conditions for stability. The authors first define two forms of stability--system and resource stability. International political systems are said to be stable when no state confronts the possibility of a loss of sovereignty. Resource stability, in contrast, requires that the current distribution of wealth and power among states can change only due to differences in the vitality of economics. The theory developed in this book refines the classic balance of power theory and formally incorporates into that theory the consideration of endogenous resource growth, preventive war, war costs, and the imperatives of geography, revealing a fundamental conflict between the concepts of "balancers" and "central powers."
The Democratic State
One outcome of the declining economic growth and rising political conflict of the 1980s has been a renewed interest in political theory and increased questioning about the durability of the capitalist state. More and more political scientists are critically assessing the prevailing pluralist vision of the relationships between the state and the economy. Is the capitalist state able to adjust to crises and contradictions? What is the role of the state in changing—deteriorating—economic circumstances? How should we understand competing interpretations on the relative autonomy of the state, the nature of property rights, the legitimation crisis? This collection of five original essays by seven of the best-known political-economy theorists addresses the interconnections between the economy and the polity and embodies the leading theoretical approaches to the political economy of the state.
Election Fraud
Allegations of fraud have marred recent elections around the world, from Russia and Italy to Mexico and the United States. Such charges raise fundamental questions about the quality of democracy in each country. Yet election fraud and, more broadly, electoral manipulation remain remarkably understudied concepts. There is no consensus on what constitutes election fraud, let alone how to detect and deter it. E lection Fraud: Detecting and Deterring Electoral Manipulation brings together experts on election law, election administration, and U.S. and comparative politics to address these critical issues. The first part of the book, which opens with an essay by Craig Donsanto of the U.S. Departme...
