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The Oxford Handbook of Economic Conflict Resolution
Individuals, groups, and societies all experience and resolve conflict. In this handbook, scholars from multiple disciplines offer perspectives on the current state and future challenges in negotiation and conflict resolution. This confluence of research perspectives will identify further synergies and advances in our understanding of conflict resolution.
Reconciliating Relational Contracting and Hold-up
We propose a unified framework to study relational contracting and hold-up problems in infinite horizon stochastic games with monetary transfers. Starting from the observation that the common formulation of relational contracts as Pareto-optimal public perfect equilibria is in stark contrast to fundamental assumptions of hold-up models, we develop a model in which relational contracts are repeatedly negotiated in a relationship. New negotiations take place with positive probability each period and treat previous informal agreements as bygones. The concept nests relational contracting and hold-up models as opposite corner cases. Allowing for intermediate cases sheds light on many plausible trade-offs that do not arise in these corner cases.
Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up
We propose a unified framework to study relational contracting and hold-up problems in infinite horizon stochastic games. We first illustrate that with respect to long run decisions, the common formulation of relational contracts as Pareto-optimal public perfect equilibria is in stark contrast to fundamental assumptions of hold-up models. We develop a model in which relational contracts are repeatedly newly negotiated during relationships. Negotiations take place with positive probability and cause bygones to be bygones. Traditional relational contracting and hold-up formulations are nested as opposite corner cases. Allowing for intermediate cases yields very intuitive results and sheds ligh...
Norms in a Partly Compliant Society
This paper considers a model of incomplete information with selfish rational types and types who comply with social or moral norms by intrinsic motivation. We explore 'complier optimal norms', which maximize expected average utility of all compliant types given that the norms are commonly known. They are compared with rule-utilitarian norms, which maximize the sum of all players' utility. Predictions under complier optimal norms match experimental evidence better and can explain a wide range of stylized facts, like conditional cooperation, costly punishment, the role of intentions, or concerns for social efficiency. We show that complier optimal norms arise from a model of voting-by-feet and can also be justified on moral grounds.
Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games
We study persuasion effects in experimental ultimatum games and find that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before deciding. Higher payoffs are driven by both lower offers and higher acceptance rates.
