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Why was the Navy ready to clear the skies over the Persian Gulf, yet surprised by the mines laid under it? Why is it that the Army is always prepared for war in Europe, but was caught off guard in Korea and Vietname? And why is the Air Force indifferent to "Star Wars"? In The Masks of War Carl H. Builder asks what motives lie behind the puzzling and often contradictory behavior of America's militay forces. The answer, he finds, has little to do with what party controls the White House or who writes the budget. Far more powerful-and glacially resistant to change-are the entrenched institutions and distinct "personalities" of the three armed services themselves. The Masks of War explains why things sometimes go wrong for the American military. It also explains why things will always go wrong for the military reformers. Changes in the military's strategic thinking have come only in the wake of full-blown disaster-Pearl Harbor, for instance. Today's nuclear world can't afford such lessons.
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists is the premier public resource on scientific and technological developments that impact global security. Founded by Manhattan Project Scientists, the Bulletin's iconic "Doomsday Clock" stimulates solutions for a safer world.
The qualities of commanders and their ideas are more important to a general theory of command and control than are the technical and architectural qualities of their computers and communications systems. This theory separates the art of command and control (C2) from the hardware and software systems that support C2. It centers on the idea of a command concept, a commander's vision of a military operation that informs the making of command decisions during that operation. The theory suggests that the essential communications up and down the chain of command can (and should) be limited to disseminating, verifying, or modifying command concepts. The theory also suggests, as an extreme case, tha...
At the end of the Reagan era, many in the U.S. Air Force began to express their concerns about the health of their institution. They questioned whether the Air Force had lost its sense of direction, its confidence, its values, even its future. For some, these concerns reflected nothing more than the maturation of the most youthful of America's military institutions. For others it was a crisis of spirit that threatened the hard-won independence of the Air Force. Although the diagnoses for this malaise are as numerous as its symptoms, The Icarus Syndrome points a finger at the abandonment of air power theory sometime in the late 1950s to early 1960s as the single, taproot cause of the problems...
defense policies, reviewing excerpts from key defense policy statements and assessing the likely challenges for future policy makers.--Brent Scowcroft "International Affairs"
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Measures command and control in 3 ways: its role in improving mission success, its affordability, and its degree of integration into the military force structure. Military managers will find this book extremely useful as they defend investments in command and control against competing demands. Bibliography, photos., tables, and figures.