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Markets for Power
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Deregulation
In this timely monograph, Paul L. Joskow argues that the crisis in the financial market should not become an excuse for reversing beneficial regulatory reforms in other sectors. The financial crisis presents a valuable opportunity to evaluate a broad range of regulatory reform options and make reasoned decisions about their rightful application to financial products and markets.
Controlling Hospital Costs
The growing public concern over rapidly rising health care costs, particularly hospital care, is understandable, with direct and indirect expenditures now amounting to about $100 billion each year. In this book, economist Paul Joskow explores the reasons for these increasing costs, the burdens of excessive hospital expenditures on the economy; and the government's role in reducing them and eliminating inefficiencies that plague the system.
Economic Regulation
This collection of readings on the industries that are economically regulated (sometimes referred to as natural monopolies) includes both theoretical and empirical articles that discuss topics such as efficient pricing for natural monopolies, including peak-load pricing, and the effects of economic regulation in practice, examining regulatory reform in a variety of industries. Joskow (economics and management, MIT) includes essays by economists such as Richard Posner, William Baumol, Nancy L. Rose, and John Vickers. No subject index. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
Handbook on Electricity Markets
With twenty-two chapters written by leading international experts, this volume represents the most detailed and comprehensive Handbook on electricity markets ever published.
Markets for Power
This timely study evaluates four generic proposals for allowing free market forces toreplace government regulation in the electric power industry and concludes that none of thederegulation alternatives considered represents a panacea for the performance failures associatedwith things as they are now. It proposes a balanced program of regulatory reform and deregulationthat promises to improve industry performance in the short run, resolve uncertainties about thecosts and benefits of deregulation, and positions the industry for more extensive deregulation inthe long run should interim experimentation with deregulation, structural, and regulatory reformsmake it desirable.The book integrates mod...
Studies in Public Regulation
"This is a stimulating collection.... Each [paper] makes an original contribution to some aspect of the economics of regulation. " Contributors Paul L. Joskow, Roger G. Noll, Robert D. Willig, Elizabeth E. Bailey, Patricia Munch, Dennis Smallwood, Richard C. Levin, Robert A. Leone, John E. Jackson, Melvyn A. Fuss, Leonard Waverman, Kenneth C. Baseman, and Sam Peltzman A Regulation of Economic Activity series paperback.
Economic Regulation and Its Reform
The past thirty years have witnessed a transformation of government economic intervention in broad segments of industry throughout the world. Many industries historically subject to economic price and entry controls have been largely deregulated, including natural gas, trucking, airlines, and commercial banking. However, recent concerns about market power in restructured electricity markets, airline industry instability amid chronic financial stress, and the challenges created by the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, which allowed commercial banks to participate in investment banking, have led to calls for renewed market intervention. Economic Regulation and Its Reform collects research by a...
Markets for Clean Air
The book analyzes the behavior and performance of the market for emissions permits, called allowances in the Acid Rain Program, and quantifies emission reductions, compliance costs, and cost savings associated with the trading program."--BOOK JACKET.
CEO Pay and Firm Performance
This study explores the dynamic structure of the pay-for- performance relationship in CEO compensation and quantifies the effect of introducing a more complex model of firm financial performance on the estimated performance sensitivity of executive pay. The results suggest that current compensation responds to past performance outcomes, but that the effect decays considerably within two years. This contrasts sharply with models of infinitely persistent performance effects implicitly assumed in much of the empirical compensation literature. We find that both accounting and market performance measures influence compensation and that the salary and bonus component of pay as well as total compensation have become more sensitive to firm financial performance over the past two decades. There is no evidence that boards fail to penalize CEOs for poor financial performance or reward them disproportionately well for good performance. Finally, the data suggest that boards may discount extreme performance outcomes -both high and low - relative to performance that lies within some `normal' band in setting compensation.
