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Is there a tradeoff between raising growth and reducing inequality and poverty? This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the complex links between growth, inequality, and poverty, with causation going in both directions. The evidence suggests that growth can be effective in reducing poverty, but its impact on inequality is ambiguous and depends on the underlying sources of growth. The impact of poverty and inequality on growth is likewise ambiguous, as several channels mediate the relationship. But most plausible mechanisms suggest that poverty and inequality reduce growth, at least in the long run. Policies play a role in shaping these relationships and those designed to improve equality of opportunity can simultaneously improve inclusiveness and growth.
We develop a model with diagnostic expectations (DE) and a financial accelerator (FA) that generates mutually reinforcing shock amplification, especially in the case of demand shocks. However, supply shocks can be dampened via a debt deflation channel, which is strengthened amid DE. Importantly, the model results in a worsening of the inflation-output volatility trade-off confronting policymakers. In contrast to most of the literature—which argues against targeting the level of asset prices—our financial accelerator model with DE suggests that targeting house price growth may result in welfare gains.
Despite strong economic growth since 2000, many low-income countries (LICs) still face numerous macroeconomic challenges, even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite the deceleration in real GDP growth during the 2008 global financial crisis, LICs on average saw 4.5 percent of real GDP growth during 2000 to 2014, making progress in economic convergence toward higher-income countries. However, the commodity price collapse in 2014–15 hit many commodity-exporting LICs and highlighted their vulnerabilities due to the limited extent of economic diversification. Furthermore, LICs are currently facing a crisis like no other—COVID-19, which requires careful policymaking to save lives and livelihoods in LICs, informed by policy debate and thoughtful research tailored to the COVID-19 situation. There are also other challenges beyond COVID-19, such as climate change, high levels of public debt burdens, and persistent structural issues.
One of the most puzzling facts in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) is that output across advanced and emerging economies recovered at a much slower rate than anticipated by most forecasting agencies. This paper delves into the mechanics behind the observed slow recovery and the associated permanent output losses in the aftermath of the crisis, with a particular focus on the role played by financial frictions and investment dynamics. The paper provides two main contributions. First, we empirically document that lower investment during financial crises is the key factor leading to permanent loss of output and total factor productivity (TFP) in the wake of a crisis. Second, we develop a DSGE model with financial frictions and capital-embodied technological change capable of reproducing the empirical facts. We also evaluate the role of financial policies in stabilizing output and TFP in response to disruptions in financial markets.
We study the optimal foreign exchange (FX) intervention policy in response to a positive terms of trade shock and associated Dutch disease episode in a small open economy model. We find that during a Dutch disease episode tradable production drops below the socially optimal level, resulting in lower welfare under learningby- doing (LBD) externalities. FX reserves accumulation improves welfare by preventing a large appreciation of the real exchange rate and by inducing an efficient reallocation between the tradable and non-tradable sectors. For an empirically plausible parametrization of LBD externalities, the model predicts that in response to a 10 percent increase in commodity prices FX reserves should increase by 1.5 percent of GDP. We also find that the welfare gains from optimally using FX reserves are twice as high as the gains from relying only on monetary policy. These results suggest that FX intervention is a beneficial policy to counteract the loss of competitiveness during a Dutch disease episode.
We document that, historically, although stronger growth in the U.S. increases growth in emerging markets, U.S. dollar appreciation (depreciation) cycles—which are highly persistent—mitigate (amplify) the impact on real GDP growth in emerging markets. We argue that the main transmission channel of the latter is through an income effect: as the dollar appreciates, commodity prices fall; weaker commodity prices depress domestic demand via lower real income; real GDP in emerging markets decelerates; and vice versa. These effects hold despite any potential expenditure-switching effect resulting from the relative (to the U.S. dollar) currency depreciation of emerging market economies. We also show the negative effect on emerging markets’ growth of U.S. interest rates beyond the effects of the U.S. real exchange rate and real GDP growth. Therefore, at the time of writing, emerging markets’ growth is expected to remain subdued reflecting, intera alia, the expected persistence of the strong dollar and the anticipated increased in the U.S. interest rates.
After the decline in oil prices, many oil exporters face the need to improve their external balances. Special characteristics of oil exporters make the exchange rate an ineffective instrument for this purpose and give fiscal policy a sizeable role. These conclusions are supported by regression analysis of the determinants of the current account balance and of the trade balance. The results show little or no relationship with the exchange rate and, especially for the less diversified oil exporters (including the Gulf Cooperation Council), a strong relationship with the fiscal balance or government spending.
Simple macroeconomic frameworks like the IS/LM have survived because they help us conceptualize complex problems while also providing ‘back of the envelope’ estimates of macroeconomic outcomes. Herein, a bare-bones New Keynesian extension of the IS/LM model yields solutions for core macro variables (output gap, inflation, interest rate, real exchange rate misvaluation)—expressed in percent. We then extend that standard model to also generate a corresponding set of demand-side elements—expressed in currency units. A key aim of the paper is to reconcile these two metrics in ways that also aid communication and intuition—including through IS/LM-style graphs.
This paper presents a semi-structural macroeconomic model aimed at facilitating policy analysis and forecasting, primarily in countries with imperfect capital mobility and hybrid monetary policy regimes. Compared to earlier gap-trend projection models, the Forecasting Model of Internal and External Balance (FINEX) contains three main innovations: it accentuates external and internal balances; explicitly incorporates fiscal policy; and partly endogenizes the main trends. FINEX thus covers a broad set of policy instruments, including foreign exchange interventions (FXI), capital flow management measures (CFM), as well as common fiscal policy instruments. The model incorporates insights from the recent DSGE literature, while maintaining a more accessible gap-trend structure that lends itself to practical policy applications. While the paper refrains from drawing broad policy lessons, it emphasizes the model's ability to interpret recent data in terms of structural shocks and policy responses, thereby aiding policymakers in constructing coherent economic narratives and considering alternative scenarios.