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"Achievement of comprehensive, effective domestic and international biosurveillance is compromised by jurisdictional complexity and inefficiencies. Federal biosurveillance policy oversight should be established in the Executive Office of the President (EOP) with the National Security Staff (NSS) as the lead entity identified to coordinate investments, interagency collaboration, and program implementation including those activities in support of the President's Global Health Initiative. An outside representative advisory group should be established to facilitate key stakeholders' interface with White House policy and technology coordinating groups. Methods and metrics used in acquiring biosur...
"The United States has a critical national security interest in preserving the health of its population, livestock, crops, and natural resources. Biosurveillance is the method used to detect, monitor and respond to the array of threats to our national security from natural, accidental, and intentional origins. On October 18, 2007, the White House released Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21 (HSPD-21) which mandates the development of a nationwide, robust, and integrated biosurveillance capability for human health, with connections to international disease surveillance systems, in order to provide early warning and ongoing characterization of disease outbreaks in near real-time. Addit...
Achievement of comprehensive, effective domestic and international biosurveillance is compromised by jurisdictional complexity and inefficiencies. Federal biosurveillance policy oversight should be established in the Executive Office of the President (EOP) with the National Security Staff (NSS) as the lead entity identified to coordinate investments, interagency collaboration, and program implementation including those activities in support of the President's Global Health Initiative. An outside representative advisory group should be established to facilitate key stakeholders' interface with White House policy and technology coordinating groups.
The U.S. gov¿t. has a history of employing health surveillance to help limit malady, loss of life, and economic impact of diseases. Recent legislation and presidential directives have called for a robust and integrated biosurveillance capability; that is, the ability to provide early detection and situational awareness of potentially catastrophic biological events. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act directed a report on the state of biosurveillance and resource use in federal, state, local, and tribal governments. This report addresses: (1) federal efforts that support a national biosurveillance capability; and (2) the extent to which mechanisms are in place to guide the development of a national biosurveillance capability. Illustrations.
Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents is a hardbound series that provides primary-source documents and expert commentary on the worldwide counter-terrorism effort. Volume 120, U.S. Preparedness for Catastrophic Attacks, discusses the critical topic of U.S. preparedness for catastrophic events. Doug Lovelace introduces documents that will inform researchers and practitioners of international law and national security about the ability of the United States to prevent and deter a catastrophic attack, as well as to mitigate and cope with the effects of such an attack.
The severe budget cuts by fed., state, and local governments are leaving public health (PH) departments understaffed and without the basic capabilities required to respond to crises. Nearly 10 years ago during the 9/11 and anthrax tragedies, it became clear the PH system was out-of-date to face modern health threats -- and an historic investment was made to help upgrade the system. Significant progress was made to improve how we prevent, identify, and contain new disease outbreaks and bioterrorism threats and respond to the aftermath of natural disasters. Now, the economic situation is putting almost a decade of gains at risk. The latest budget cuts will exacerbate the vulnerable areas in U.S. emergency health preparedness. A print on demand report.
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the anthrax letters, the ability to detect biological threats as quickly as possible became a top priority. In 2003 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) introduced the BioWatch program-a federal monitoring system intended to speed detection of specific biological agents that could be released in aerosolized form during a biological attack. The present volume evaluates the costs and merits of both the current BioWatch program and the plans for a new generation of BioWatch devices. BioWatch and Public Health Surveillance also examines infectious disease surveillance through hospitals and public health agencies in the United States, and considers whether BioWatch and traditional infectious disease surveillance are redundant or complementary.
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and subsequent anthrax mailings, the U.S. government prioritized a biosurveillance strategy aimed at detecting, monitoring, and characterizing national security health threats in human and animal populations, food, water, agriculture, and the environment. However, gaps and challenges in biosurveillance efforts and integration of biosurveillance activities remain. September 8-9, 2011, the IOM held a workshop to explore the information-sharing and collaboration processes needed for the nation's integrated biosurveillance strategy.