Welcome to our book review site go-pdf.online!
You may have to Search all our reviewed books and magazines, click the sign up button below to create a free account.
The Origins of Dominant Parties
In many autocracies, regime leaders share power with a ruling party, which can help generate popular support and reduce conflict among key elites. Such ruling parties are often called dominant parties. In other regimes, leaders prefer to rule solely through some combination of charisma, patronage, and coercion, rather than sharing power with a dominant party. This book explains why dominant parties emerge in some nondemocratic regimes, but not in others. It offers a novel theory of dominant party emergence that centers on the balance of power between rulers and other elites. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in Russia, original data on Russian political elites, and cross-national statistical analysis, the book's findings shed new light on how modern autocracies work and why they break down. The book also provides new insights about the foundations of Vladimir Putin's regime and challenges several myths about the personalization of power under Putin.
Online Social Media and Political Awareness in Authoritarian Regimes
Does online social media undermine authoritarianism? We examine the conditions under which online social networks can increase public awareness of electoral fraud in non-democracies. We argue that a given online social network will only increase political awareness if it is first politicized by elites. Using survey data from the 2011 Russian parliamentary elections, we show that usage of Twitter and Facebook, which were politicized by opposition elites, significantly increased respondents' perceptions of electoral fraud, while usage of Russia's domestic social networking platforms, Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki, which were not politicized by opposition activists, had no effect on perceptions of fraud. Our study elucidates the causes of post-election protest by uncovering a mechanism through which knowledge of electoral fraud can become widespread.
Who's to Blame? Political Centralization and Electoral Punishment Under Authoritarianism
Does decentralization affect how voters attribute blame for poor economic performance? The question of whether political centralization ties regime leaders to local economic outcomes is particularly important in authoritarian regimes, where economic performance legitimacy is a key source of regime stability. Using political and economic data from large Russian cities for the period 2003-2012, we investigate whether replacing direct mayoral elections with appointments affects the way voters attribute blame for economic outcomes. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that the ruling party is more likely to be punished for poor economic performance in cities with appointed mayors than it is in cities with elected mayors.
Subnational Appointments in Authoritarian Regimes
Elections are among the most important and least understood institutions in contemporary authoritarian regimes. Theoretically, electoral authoritarian regimes should have an informational advantage that makes them more robust than other types of authoritarian regimes, but much empirical evidence suggests otherwise. In this paper we offer a new perspective on why this might be the case. Specifically, we consider how authoritarian elections influence a ruler's choices in making cadre appointments. We argue that the imperative of winning authoritarian elections forces authoritarian leaders to prioritize the appointment of politically loyal cadres, who can help the regime win elections. This choice often comes at the expense of appointing officials who are competent at making good public policy and promoting economic development, factors that may contribute to long-term regime stability. We test this theory using an original dataset of gubernatorial appointments in one leading contemporary authoritarian regime, Russia.
Russian Politics Today
An accessible and nuanced introduction to contemporary Russian politics using the theme of stability versus fragility as its overarching framework. This innovative textbook explores core themes as well as path-breaking insights into the politics of race, class, gender, sexuality, and the environment.
Legislatures, Cooptation, and Social Protest in Contemporary Authoritarian Regimes
A central claim of the new literature on authoritarianism is that legislatures extend the lifespan of authoritarian regimes. However, there are a wide range of possible mechanisms that might underpin this relationship. In this paper, we contribute both to the theory and the empirics of legislative cooptation under authoritarianism by exploring one such mechanism. We argue that legislative cooptation extends the longevity of authoritarian regimes by reducing anti-regime street protest. Legislatures reduce social protest by providing rent-seeking opportunities to key opposition elites who, in return, demobilize their supporters. Legislatures may also reduce protest by drawing mobilizational resources into the political system and away from anti-system groups. Using new data from 83 Russian regional legislatures, we look at how variation in the distribution of legislative leadership positions to opposition groups affects levels of opposition street protest.
The Political Economy of Russian Gubernatorial Election and Appointment
Political and economic outcomes depend, in part, on the quality of the officials making policy. Many scholars argue that the free and fair elections are the best method for selecting competent officials. Others, however, argue that elections can lead to the selection of amateurs, demagogues, and political sycophants. Under this view, sub-national officials should be appointed by centralized planners who are insulated from local popular pressures. In this paper, we use original data on the biographies of Russian regional governors to determine whether the backgrounds of governors elected between 1992 and 2004 differ from the backgrounds of appointed governors post-2004. We find that the two g...
Weak Strongman
"Media and public discussion tends to understand Russian politics as a direct reflection of Vladimir Putin's seeming omnipotence or Russia's unique history and culture. Yet Russia is remarkably similar to other autocracies -- and recognizing this illuminates the inherent limits to Putin's power. Weak Strongman challenges the conventional wisdom about Putin's Russia, highlighting the difficult trade-offs that confront the Kremlin on issues ranging from election fraud and repression to propaganda and foreign policy. Drawing on three decades of his own on-the-ground experience and research as well as insights from a new generation of social scientists that have received little attention outside...
Dialogue with the Dictator
Shows how autocrats structure interaction between citizens and leaders to manage information dilemmas and build regime legitimacy. Uses interviews, original surveys, and text analysis to highlight the tools used by Russian President Vladimir Putin to reinforce his now twenty-year rule-and how these tools may backfire against the regime.
Developments in Russian Politics 9
In Developments in Russian Politics 9 an international team of experts provides a clearly written and comprehensive account of the country's most recent developments, offering critical discussions of key areas in contemporary domestic and foreign Russian politics. All essays are either new or comprehensively rewritten for this volume and examine topics ranging from executive leadership, political parties, and elections to newer issues of national identity, protest, and Russia and greater Eurasia. They also address the military, parliamentary politics, the economy, social inequality, and media and political communication in the digital age. Reflecting the changing nature of Russian politics in a globalizing world defined by ever-shifting balances of power and Russia's rising tensions with the West, Developments in Russian Politics remains the best introduction to the politics of the world's largest nation. Contributors. Samuel Charap, Valentina Feklyunina, Henry E. Hale, Philip Hanson, Kathryn Hendley, Marlene Laruelle, Ellen Mickiewicz, Ben Noble, Thomas F. Remington, Bettina Renz, Ora John Reuter, Graeme Robertson, Richard Sakwa, Darrell Slider, Stephen White, John P. Willerton
