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Robert Brandom's Making it Explicit (1994) marks a Copernican turn in the philosophy of mind and language, as this collection of critical essays together with Brandom's enlightening answers convincingly shows. Though faithful to Wittgenstein's pragmatic turn in spirit, Brandom gives a systematic account of human sapience as a whole by grounding our relation to the world by words on our discursive practice, assessing its normative basis, which is instituted by scorekeeping activities and sanctioning attitudes, and thus trying to avoid mystifying mentalism as well as dogmatic naturalism in our account of the human spirit. The topics emphasized in this volume concern the place of B...
This unique collection focuses on the unexamined connections between two contemporary, intensively debated lines of inquiry: Hegel-inspired theories of recognition (Anerkennung) and analytical social ontology. These lines address the roots of human sociality from different conceptual perspectives and have complementary strengths, variously stressing the social constitution of persons in interpersonal relations and the emergence of social and institutional reality through collective intentionality. In this book leading theorists and younger scholars offer original analyses of the connections and suggest new ways in which theories of recognition and current approaches in analytical social ontology can enrich one another.
Offering one of the first initiatives of reconciliation between the analytic and continental philosophical traditions, this important collection of original essays offers a new perspective on Hegel's philosophy within the context of some of the themes central to current discussion. Placing Hegel at the intersection between continental and analytic philosophy, the book presents an indispensible guide to the most current contemporary debates and to an emerging topic within Hegel studies. Analytic philosophy has long been held to consider Hegel its bête noir. Yet in fact Hegel and analytic philosophy converge on some crucial issues, which suggests that, although analytic philosophy initially declared its anti-Hegelianism, it is in fact nourished of Hegelian themes and defended through Hegelian concepts. The essays in this volume address this apparent paradox, offering 'analytic' readings of Hegel, Hegelian readings of the analytic tradition, historical explorations of Hegel's confrontation with Kant and of the analytic tradition's debt to Hegel, and new interpretations of Hegelian texts.
World-renowned analytic philosophers John McDowell and Robert Brandom, dubbed “Pittsburgh Neo-Hegelians,” recently engaged in an intriguing debate about perception. In The Intentional Spectrum and Intersubjectivity Michael D. Barber is the first to bring phenomenology to bear not just on the perspectives of McDowell or Brandom alone, but on their intersection. He argues that McDowell accounts better for the intelligibility of empirical content by defending holistically functioning, reflectively distinguishable sensory and intellectual intentional structures. He reconstructs dimensions implicit in the perception debate, favoring Brandom on knowledge’s intersubjective features that converge with the ethical characteristics of intersubjectivity Emmanuel Levinas illuminates. Phenomenology becomes the third partner in this debate between two analytic philosophers, critically mediating their discussion by unfolding the systematic interconnection among perception, intersubjectivity, metaphilosophy, and ethics.
This edited volume explores the different and seminal ways colours matter to philosophy. Each chapter provides an insightful analysis of one or more cases in which colours raise philosophical problems in different areas and periods of philosophy. This historically informed discussion examines both logical and linguistic aspects, covering such areas as the mind, aesthetics and the foundations of mathematics. The international contributors look at traditional epistemological and metaphysical issues on the subjectivity and objectivity of colours. In addition, they also assess phenomenological problems typical of the continental tradition and contemporary problems in the philosophy of mind. The ...
In this book - the first large-scale survey of the complex relationship between Hegel's idealism and Anglo-American analytic philosophy - Tom Rockmore argues that analytic philosophy has consistently misread and misappropriated Hegel. According to Rockmore, the first generation of British analytic philosophers to engage Hegel possessed a limited understanding of his philosophy and of idealism. Succeeding generations continued to misinterpret him, and recent analytic thinkers have turned Hegel into a pragmatist by ignoring his idealism. Rockmore explains why this has happened, defends Hegel's idealism, and points out the ways that Hegel is a key figure for analytic concerns, focusing in particular on the fact that he and analytic philosophers both share an interest in the problem of knowledge.
Hegel’s Philosophical Psychology draws attention to a largely overlooked piece of Hegel’s philosophy: his substantial and philosophically rich treatment of psychology at the end of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, which itself belongs to his main work, the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. This volume makes the case that Hegel’s approach to philosophy of mind as developed within this text can make an important contribution to current discussions about mind and subjectivity, and can help clarify the notion of spirit (Geist) within Hegel’s larger philosophical project. Scholars from different schools of Hegelian thought provide a multifaceted overview of Hegel’s Psycho...
The volume collects the contributions to an international conference held at the University of Frankfurt on the relationship between epistemic practices (culture of knowledge) and the concept of knowledge (ideal of knowledge) in Plato. For Plato, both aspects of knowledge were not only of equal importance, he was also well aware of their interdependence, taking into account that no philosopher has yet reached the epistemic level of knowledge. His acknowledgement of this interdependence is, as the papers of this volume show, further counter-evidence against the traditional reading that attributes to Plato a two-worlds-view which tries to keep ordinary belief and philosophical knowledge ontologically distinct. The contributions include essays from both ancient philosophers and ancient historians. Topics of the essays are e.g. the conception of education in the "Republic", the epistemic ascent in the "Symposion", the knowledge of knowledge in the "Charmides", the role of perception in the "Theaetetus" and the sophistic environment of Plato.
Arguing that our attachment to Aristotelian modes of discourse makes a revision of their conceptual foundations long overdue, the author proposes the consideration of unacknowledged factors that play a central role in argument itself. These are in particular the subjective imprint and the dynamics of argumentation. Their inclusion in a four-dimensional framework (subjective-objective, structural-procedural) and the focus on thesis validity allow for a more realistic view of our discourse practice. Exhaustive analyses of fascinating historical and contemporary arguments are provided. These range from Columbus’s advocacy of the Western Passage to India, over the trial of King Louis XVI durin...
Trevor N. Wedman seeks to understand the key assumptions underlying modern legal theory. Going back to Hobbes, but also making use of the developments in the theory of action and language philosophy over the past century, he breaks down the static conception of the state into one dependent on the actions and reflections of individuals, i.e., its citizens. He develops a social ontological theory of the law, in which the law is not taken as a mere given, but as an institutional fact. He criticizes both the Kelsenian conception of the Basic Norm and the Hartian notion of the Rule of Recognition as failing to account for the agency of individuals. The author turns to the work of one of Kelsen's contemporaries, Felix Somlo, in order to develop an alternative conception of the law that operates not from the top down, but from the bottom up. In this way, the law itself comes into focus as that which results from the reasoned jurisprudential reflection on the reality of meanings and actions.