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Consumer-Driven Demand and Operations Management Models
This important book is by top scholars in supply chain management, revenue management, and e-commerce, all of which are grounded in information technologies and consumer demand research. The book looks at new selling techniques designed to reach the consumer.
Multi-Attribute Loss Aversion and Reference Dependence
We study the prevalence of multi-attribute loss aversion and reference effects in a revenue management setting based on data of individual level purchases over a series of concert performances. The reference dependence that drives consumer choice is not only based on the price but also on observed sales (as a fraction of the seating capacity) during their past visits. We find that consumers suffer from loss aversion on both prices and seats sold: consumers incur significant utility loss when prices are above their references or when the actual seat sales are lower than their references. We suggest pricing policies that can address consumer decisions driven by such reference dependence and loss aversion.
Blind Queues
In many service settings, customers have to join the queue without being fully aware of the parameters of the service provider (for e.g., customers at check-out counters may not know the true service rate prior to joining). In such “blind queues”, customers make their joining/balking decisions based on the limited information about the service provider's operational parameters (from past service experiences, reviews, etc.), and queue lengths. We analyze a firm serving customers making decisions under arbitrary beliefs about the service parameters in an observable queue for a service with known price. We propose an ordering for the balking threshold distributions in customer population, w...
Customer Herding in Services with Waiting Costs
We explore customer choice behavior when they face a choice between service providers of unknown service value. Customers arrive according to a Poisson process to the market. Service times are exponentially distributed with the same rate at each service provider. Both the service providers are capacitated (finite buffers), and the customers incur waiting costs when waiting for service. Customers observe decisions made by other customers in the form of queue lengths before making their choice. If more customers choose the same service, longer queues will form at the service. Therefore, the arriving customers infer service value is better at the service with the longer queue and would prefer t...
Is it Worth the Wait? Service Choice and Externalities When Waiting is Expensive
We study how rational customers choose between two congested service facilities with finite buffer space and unknown service value when waiting is expensive. Customers observe an imperfect private signal indicating which service facility may provide more service value, as well as the queue lengths at the service facilities before making their choice. If more customers choose the same service facility because of their private information, longer queues will form at the service facility and therefore a long queue may be an indication of higher quality. On the other hand, a long queue also implies more waiting time to obtain the service. We characterize the equilibrium queue-joining behavior of...
Joining Longer Queues
A classic example that illustrates how observed customer behavior impacts other customers' decisions is the selection of a restaurant whose quality is uncertain. Customers often choose the busier restaurant, inferring that other customers in that restaurant know something that they do not. In an environment with random arrival and service times, customer behavior is reflected in the lengths of the queues that form at the individual servers. Queue lengths could signal two factors - potentially higher arrivals to the server or potentially slower service at the server. We study the effect of both arrival and service rates on the inference made by an arriving customer.In our model, based on both...
Firm Service Rate Selection When Service Rates are Not Observable and Service Value is Unknown to the Market
We study how a high quality service firm selects a service rate differently than a low quality service firm when the firm cannot communicate its service value or service rate to its customer base. As a result, potential customers may take the queue length upon arrival into account when assessing the service value before joining the queue for service. We show that customer queue joining behavior may not be of the threshold type, which is a typical equilibrium structure under observable service value and rate. Furthermore, we find differentiating equilibria in which the high quality service firm selects a slower service rate than the low quality service firm, even if the cost of speeding up is the same for both firms. We also find that both firm's profit rates under such a differentiating equilibrium may be higher than in equilibria in which both firms select the same service rate. Our research thus provides a rational explanation for often-quoted suspicions that some firms deliberately slow down service to signal quality.
Seat Value in Stadiums and Theaters
We study how the seat value perceived by consumers, after attending an event in a theater/stadium, depends on the location of their seat relative to the stage/field. We develop a measure of perceived seat value, called Seat Value Index, and relate it to seat location characteristics and consumer characteristics. We apply our analysis to a proprietary dataset collected by a professional baseball franchise in Japan, from its customers during a weeknight game. Most surprisingly, we find that customers seated in symmetric seats on left and right fields might derive very different valuations from the game. Thus, commonly followed simple pricing mechanisms in baseball stadiums might be inefficient...
Does Fake News Create Echo Chambers?
Platforms have come under criticism from regulatory agencies, policymakers, and media scholars for the unfettered spread of fake news online. A key concern is that, as fake news becomes prevalent, individuals may fall into online "echo chambers" that predominantly expose them only to fake news. Using a dataset reporting 30,995 individual households' online activity, we empirically examine the reach of false news content and whether echo chambers exist. We find that the population is widely exposed to online false news. However, echo chambers are minimal, and the most avid readers of false news content regularly expose themselves to mainstream news sources. Using a natural experiment occurrin...
