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The ability of attackers to undermine, disrupt and disable information and communication technology systems used by financial institutions is a threat to financial stability and one that requires additional attention.
This paper highlights the emerging supervisory practices that contribute to effective cybersecurity risk supervision, with an emphasis on how these practices can be adopted by those agencies that are at an early stage of developing a supervisory approach to strengthen cyber resilience. Financial sector supervisory authorities the world over are working to establish and implement a framework for cyber risk supervision. Cyber risk often stems from malicious intent, and a successful cyber attack—unlike most other sources of risk—can shut down a supervised firm immediately and lead to systemwide disruptions and failures. The probability of attack has increased as financial systems have become more reliant on information and communication technologies and as threats have continued to evolve.
This paper examines key considerations around central bank digital currency (CBDC) for use by the general public, based on a comprehensive review of recent research, central bank experiments, and ongoing discussions among stakeholders. It looks at the reasons why central banks are exploring retail CBDC issuance, policy and design considerations; legal, governance and regulatory perspectives; plus cybersecurity and other risk considerations. This paper makes a contribution to the CBDC literature by suggesting a structured framework to organize discussions on whether or not to issue CBDC, with an operational focus and a project management perspective.
Over 100 central banks around the globe are exploring central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) to modernize payment systems. They aim to explore potential benefits, risks, and the broad range of new capabilities CBDCs might offer. Some view CBDC exploration as an opportunity to rethink their existing, legacy payment systems and build a resilient and secure infrastructure using modern technologies. However, a CBDC creates a vast and complex ecosystem that amplifies existing risk exposures and surfaces new ones. Given the implications of issuing a CBDC, it should be seen as a fundamental change in the way the central bank operates. This note considers experiences from live CBDCs and is informed by experiments conducted by central banks and international institutions for domestic use. It also draws from cybersecurity and resilience frameworks from standard-setting bodies.
This paper focuses on smart policies that can alleviate the short-term pain of technological disruption and pave the way for long-term gain. As computing power improves dramatically and more and more people around the world participate in the digital economy, care should be taken about how to devise policies that will allow us to fully exploit the digital revolution’s benefits while minimizing job dislocation. Digital technology will spread further, and efforts to ignore it or legislate against it will likely fail. Even with short-term dislocations, reorganizing the economy around revolutionary technologies generates huge long-term benefits. The digital revolution should be accepted and improved rather than ignored and repressed. Given the global reach of digital technology, and the risk of a race to the bottom, there is a need for policy cooperation like that of global financial markets and sea and air traffic. The history of earlier general-purpose technologies demonstrates that even with short-term dislocations, reorganizing the economy around revolutionary technologies generates huge long-term benefits.
The IMF is frequently approached by central banks seeking guidance on the balance between central bank digital currency (CBDC), fast payment systems (FPS), and electronic money (e-money) solutions. Common questions arising include: Do central banks need a CBDC when already equipped with other well-established digital payments systems? For central banks with less-developed solutions: Should central banks establish one system over the other? This discussion is then compounded by the reality of constrained resources. This note focuses on the comparison of retail CBDC—that is, the presence of digital central bank money available to the general public—with FPS and e-money systems from a payme...
Despite strong economic growth since 2000, many low-income countries (LICs) still face numerous macroeconomic challenges, even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite the deceleration in real GDP growth during the 2008 global financial crisis, LICs on average saw 4.5 percent of real GDP growth during 2000 to 2014, making progress in economic convergence toward higher-income countries. However, the commodity price collapse in 2014–15 hit many commodity-exporting LICs and highlighted their vulnerabilities due to the limited extent of economic diversification. Furthermore, LICs are currently facing a crisis like no other—COVID-19, which requires careful policymaking to save lives and livelihoods in LICs, informed by policy debate and thoughtful research tailored to the COVID-19 situation. There are also other challenges beyond COVID-19, such as climate change, high levels of public debt burdens, and persistent structural issues.
Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago requested for technical assistance to: (i) strengthen the cybersecurity posture of the Central Bank, and (ii) strengthen the cybersecurity of the financial institutions. The mission provided support in a project aimed at enhancing its cybersecurity posture focusing on governance and Identity and Access Management (IAM), provided guidance in drafting a guideline applicable to financial institutions and conducted a seminar on regulations. The recommendations focused on strengthening governance aspects, defining the IAM project and drafting a regulation for the financial institutions.
The United Kingdom faces significant money laundering threats from foreign criminal proceeds, owing to its status as a global financial center, but the authorities have a strong understanding of these risks. The authorities estimated the realistic possibility of hundreds of billions of pounds of illicit proceeds being laundered in their jurisdiction. The money laundering risks facing the United Kingdom include illicit proceeds from foreign crimes such as transnational organized crime, overseas corruption, and tax crimes. Financial services, trust, and company service providers (TCSPs), accountancy and legal sectors are high-risk for money laundering, with also significant emerging risks comi...
The U.K. financial sector is globally systemic, open, and complex. It has weathered the COVID-19 pandemic fittingly, thanks to the post-GFC reforms, a proactive macroprudential stance, and an effective multipronged response to maintain financial stability. Brexit uncertainties are being handled appropriately as the U.K. and EU authorities and the financial industry collaborate to prevent undesirable financial stability outcomes. The endpoint of the pandemic remains unclear, as does the actual impact on the financial system once support measures wane. At this juncture, therefore, financial stability conditions in the United Kingdom are being shaped by three key considerations: (i) the evolving U.K.-EU relationship on financial services; (ii) securing a sustainable and robust post-pandemic economic recovery; and (iii) successfully managing ongoing structural transitions.