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In this book, Erick Raphael Jiménez examines Aristotle's concept of mind (nous), a key concept in Aristotelian psychology, metaphysics, and epistemology. Drawing on a close analysis of De Anima, Jiménez argues that mind is neither disembodied nor innate, as has commonly been held, but an embodied ability that emerges from learning and discovery. Looking to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jiménez argues that just as Aristotelian mind is not innate, intelligibility is not an innate feature of the objects of Aristotelian mind, but an outcome of certain mental constructions that make those objects intelligible. Conversely, it is through these same mental constructions that thinkers become intelligent, or come to possess minds. Connecting this account to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jiménez shows how this concept of mind fits within Aristotle's wider philosophy. His bold interpretation will interest a wide range of readers in ancient and later philosophy.
In this book, Erick Raphael Jimenez examines Aristotle's concept of mind (nous), a key concept in Aristotelian psychology, metaphysics, and epistemology. Drawing on a close analysis of De Anima, Jimenez argues that mind is neither disembodied nor innate, as has commonly been held, but an embodied ability that emerges from learning and discovery. Looking to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jimenez argues that, just as Aristotelian mind is not innate, intelligibility is not an innate feature of the objects of Aristotelian mind, but an outcome of certain mental constructions that make those objects intelligible. Conversely, it is through these same mental constructions that thinkers become intelligent, or come to possess minds. Connecting this account to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jimenez shows how this concept of mind fits within Aristotle's wider philosophy. His bold interpretation will interest a wide range of readers in ancient and later philosophy.
A fresh interpretation of this important and widely misunderstood concept as an acquired ability to make principles and essences intelligible.
Aristotle is one of the most crucial figures in the history of Western thought, and his name and ideas continue to be invoked in a wide range of contemporary philosophical discussions. The Bloomsbury Companion to Aristotle brings together leading scholars from across the world and from a variety of philosophical traditions to survey the recent research on Aristotle's thought and its contributions to the full spectrum of philosophical enquiry, from logic to the natural sciences and psychology, from metaphysics to ethics, politics, and aesthetics. Further essays address aspects of the transmission, preservation, and elaboration of Aristotle's thought in subsequent phases of the history of philosophy (from the Judeo-Arabic reception to debates in Europe and North America), and look forward to potential future directions for the study of his thought. In addition, The Bloomsbury Companion to Aristotle includes an extensive range of essential pedagogic tools offering assistance to researchers working in the field, including a chronology of recent research, a glossary of key Aristotelian terms with Latin concordances and textual references, and a guide to further reading.
The Ways of Wisdom answers the demand for a new kind of theology appropriate for a postsecular, global civilization, showing how to engage questions of meaning and value across as well as within traditions. Arguing that humanity is the desire to be God, The Ways of Wisdom analyzes the diverse ways in which humanity has pursued this aim, and argues for a synthesis that draws on the great spiritual traditions of the Axial Age as well as on the humanistic secular commitment to innerworldly civilizational progress and social justice. At the same time, it rejects both the technocratic god-building that it argues is the hegemonic ideal of the Saeculum in which we live and the radical immanentism that imagined that we could create a collective political subject that would make us the masters of our own destiny, proposing instead what it calls Sanctuary, a way of life centered on seeking wisdom, doing justice, and ripening Being.
Offering a provocative alternative to the dominant approaches of Plato scholarship, the Tübingen School suggests that the dialogues do not tell the full story of Plato's philosophical teachings. Texts and fragments by his students and their followers—most famously Aristotle's Physics—point to an "unwritten doctrine" articulated by Plato at the Academy. These unwritten teachings had a more systematic character than those presented in the dialogues, which according to this interpretation were meant to be introductory. The Tübingen School reconstructs a historical, critical, and systematic account of Plato that takes into account testimony about these teachings as well as the dialogues themselves. The Other Plato collects seminal and more recent essays by leading proponents of this approach, providing a comprehensive overview of the Tübingen School for English readers.
This book addresses a lacuna in scholarship concerning Hannah Arendt’s Augustinian heritage that has predominantly focused on her early work. It de-canonises the sources that political theology has appealed to by shifting the interpretive focus to her mature treatment in The Life of the Mind. Arendt’s initial criticism of Augustinian desiring is that it generates 'worldlessness'. In her later works, Arendt develops a more nuanced reading of the movements of thinking, desiring, and loving in her engagement with Augustine. This study attends to these movements and inspects the spatio-temporal framework which structure Arendt’s conception of the political. The author assesses the claim th...
This book is open access under a CC BY 4.0 license. This book explores how the socially disputed period of the Cold War is remembered in today’s history classroom. Applying a diverse set of methodological strategies, the authors map the dividing lines in and between memory cultures across the globe, paying special attention to the impact the crisis-driven age of our present has on images of the past. Authors analysing educational media point to ambivalence, vagueness and contradictions in textbook narratives understood to be echoes of societal and academic controversies. Others focus on teachers and the history classroom, showing how unresolved political issues create tensions in history education. They render visible how teachers struggle to handle these challenges by pretending that what they do is ‘just history’. The contributions to this book unveil how teachers, backgrounding the political inherent in all memory practices, often nourish the illusion that the history in which they are engaged is all about addressing the past with a reflexive and disciplined approach.
In this major new work, Richard J. Bernstein argues that many of the most important themes in philosophy during the past one hundred and fifty years are variations and developments of ideas that were prominent in the classical American pragmatists: Charles S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey and George H Mead. Pragmatism begins with a thoroughgoing critique of the Cartesianism that dominated so much of modern philosophy. The pragmatic thinkers reject a sharp dichotomy between subject and object, mind-body dualism, the quest for certainty and the spectator theory of knowledge. They seek to bring about a sea change in philosophy that highlights the social character of human experience and nor...
This book considers the emergence of dialectic out of the spirit of dialogue and traces the relation between the two. It moves from Plato, for whom dialectic is necessary to destroy incorrect theses and attain thinkable being, to Cusanus, to modern philosophers—Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher and Gadamer, for whom dialectic becomes the driving force behind the constitution of a rational philosophical system. Conceived as a logical enterprise, dialectic strives to liberate itself from dialogue, which it views as merely accidental and even disruptive of thought, in order to become a systematic or scientific method. The Cartesian autonomous and universal yet utterly monological and lonely subject requires dialectic alone to reason correctly, yet dialogue, despite its unfinalizable and interruptive nature, is what constitutes the human condition.