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Learning from Experience
This volume presents a set of lessons learned from the United Kingdom's Astute submarine program that could help inform future program managers. Designing and building a submarine requires careful management and oversight and a delegation of roles and responsibilities that recognizes which party--the shipbuilder or the government--is best positioned to manage risks.
Sustaining U.S. Nuclear Submarine Design Capabilities
For the first time since the design of the first nuclear submarine, the U.S. Navy has no nuclear submarine design program under way, which raises the possibility that design capability could be lost. Such a loss could result in higher costs and delays when the next submarine design is undertaken, as well as risks to system performance and safety. The authors estimate and compare the costs and delays of letting design capability erode vs. those of alternative means of managing the workload and workforce over the gap in design demand and beyond. The authors recommend that the Navy consider stret.
Learning from Experience
The United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from previous submarine programs that could help inform future program managers. This volume presents an overview of five submarine programs in the three countries--the UK's Astute program; the U.S. Navy's Ohio, Seawolf, and Virginia programs; and Australia's Collins program--and identifies lessons that apply to all of them.
Sustaining U.S. Nuclear Submarine Design Capabilities
The U.S. submarine eet currently numbers more than 50 fast attack submarines (SSNs) and 18 submarines built to launch ballistic missiles (SSBNs). All are nuclear powered to maximize the duration and speed of underwater operations. While the submarine eet has been decreasing in size since the end of the Cold War, it is anticipated that the U.S. Navy will sustain a force of several dozen boats into the foreseeable future. Submarines are almost continually being built to replace older ones that must be retired. As is the case with surface ships, submarines are built in classes sets of boats constructed to a common design. Designing a new class of nuclear submarines is a very large and complex endeavor, lasting 15 years or longer and requiring 15,000 to 20,000 man-years at the prime shipyard contractor alone.
Learning from Experience
Annotation This volume presents a set of lessons learned from the United Kingdom's Astute submarine program that could help inform future program managers. Designing and building a submarine requires careful management and oversight and a delegation of roles and responsibilities that recognizes which party--the shipbuilder or the government--is best positioned to manage risks.
